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 Public services are the bedrock of modern society.They impact on people’s 
everyday lives to a greater or lesser degree: from education and health services 
to public transport, refuse collection and state pensions. This report explores 
the interaction between individuals and instututions, analysing to what extent 
the key social servies are responsible for shaping the quality of people’s lives. 
Drawing on findings from the second European Quality of Life Survey, carried 
out by Eurofound in 2007 across 28 countries in Europe, the report gives a wide-
ranging picture of the diverse social realities in Europe today. It assesses the 
multiple influences at work in society – such as access to health services, quality 
of local environment, racial and ethnic mix, as well as police and legal and 
political bodies – in the light of individual income, gender and age. 
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vForeword
The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) was conducted by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) for the first time in 2003, covering 28 
countries (the 15 EU Member States, 12 forthcoming Member States and Turkey). Eurofound’s second 
round of the EQLS, which was carried out in 2007, offers a wide-ranging view of the diverse social 
realities in 31 countries – the current 27 EU Member States, Norway and the candidate countries of 
Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.
Many of the questions posed in the first EQLS in 2003 were asked again, on issues such as employment, 
income, education, housing, family, health, work–life balance, life satisfaction and perceived quality 
of society. In 2008, Eurofound commissioned secondary analyses of the EQLS data around key policy 
themes. The selected themes for the first round of secondary analysis are the following: trends in quality 
of life in Europe 2003–2008; living conditions, social exclusion and mental well-being; family life and 
work; subjective well-being; and quality of society and public services.
This analytical report focuses on the latter theme – Evaluating the quality of society and public services – 
highlighting how both factors are fundamental to people’s quality of life. The report draws on the results 
of the EQLS to create innovative indexes for the quality of societies and public services, identifying 
differences between European countries and on the basis of individual characteristics and resources. 
In doing so, it examines how people evaluate the factors impacting on quality of society – including 
key public services, neighbourhood environment and crime, access to health services, along with trust 
in institutions and people, and perceived tensions in society.
It is intended that the report will highlight policies that could increase social cohesion during challenging 
times in Europe. We hope that this study will contribute towards assessing and improving the quality 
of society and its services, and in turn, people’s quality of life across Europe today. 
Jorma Karppinen Erika Mezger 
Director Deputy Director
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Country codes
EU15 15 EU Member States prior to enlargement in 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) 
NMS12 12 New Member States, 10 of which joined the EU in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) – and are 
sometimes referred to as the NMS10 – and the remaining two in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania)
EU27 27 EU Member States
EU27
AT Austria LV  Latvia
BE Belgium LT Lithuania 
BG Bulgaria LU Luxembourg
CY Cyprus MT Malta
CZ Czech Republic NL Netherlands
DK Denmark PL Poland
EE Estonia PT Portugal
FI Finland RO  Romania
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1Executive summary
Introduction
A person’s quality of life is not only shaped by individual choices and behaviour: the surrounding 
environment and the public services on offer have a big influence on how people perceive the society 
they live in and on their evaluation of their own quality of life. Institutions influence the quality 
of society through collective actions that individuals cannot undertake themselves: for example 
maintaining schools, hospitals and roads. Public policies are also responsible for ensuring that water 
and air are not polluted, and for reducing tensions between different social groups. If public policies 
are effective and these services are provided to a high standard, the quality of society will improve, 
with a positive impact on the overall quality of life of citizens. 
This is why European policymakers and citizens share a common concern regarding the quality of 
society and public services: the actions of policymakers should contribute to improving the quality 
of citizens’ lives. To evaluate whether this is in fact happening, one needs to look beyond objective 
measures of material wealth such as gross domestic product (GDP) and find out how citizens assess 
the conditions in their society. The second European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), carried out by the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) in 2007, 
asks European citizens to evaluate multiple aspects of quality of society. The result is a comprehensive 
picture of the diverse social realities in the 27 EU Member States, in Norway, Croatia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.  
Because the quality of society cannot be reduced to a single measurement figure, the report presents a 
number of innovative indexes based on answers to the EQLS: a Public Services Index, a Neighbourhood 
Services Index, a Health Service Index, an index measuring trust in institutions and one measuring 
tensions in society. Based on the analysis of these indexes, the report goes on to identify the extent to 
which the quality of society and public services differ between European countries. The analysis also 
shows that there are differences in the evaluation of society within countries associated with differences 
in income, age and gender. 
Policy context
The aim of advancing the quality of society in Europe today creates fresh challenges in an EU that 
brings together 27 different countries. It means promoting social cohesion in societies that are becoming 
more diverse internally, as increasing numbers of people take advantage of the entitlement to travel 
and work across the Union. In addition, the economic crisis leads to demands to prevent European 
societies from being divided between those who have not been immediately affected by the downturn 
and others who have. The EU’s success in responding to these challenges is essential, insofar as 
European integration depends for its legitimacy on effectively promoting the quality of European 
society for all Europe’s citizens. But it is not only the EU and its institutions that are challenged by 
these developments. All those providing services that contribute to the quality of society – national, 
regional and local governments, as well as social partners and civil society institutions – must address 
the evaluations made  by citizens and hence improve policies and action.
Key findings
■	 The Public Services Index covers education, healthcare, public transport, childcare, care for the 
elderly and the pension systems. The majority of European citizens assess these services positively. 
Evaluations regarding public services are, however, relatively higher among Europeans who have 
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an adequate income and lower in countries where government corruption is regarded as being at a 
high level.           
■	 The Neighbourhood Services Index deals with air and noise pollution, waste collection, water 
quality, green spaces and crime. Overall, the results are positive: 42% of Europeans have no 
complaints about any of these six areas and less than one in 10 has many complaints. Satisfaction 
with neighbourhood services and crime control is substantially lower in urban areas and, within 
cities, for people living in neighbourhoods with a greater racial or ethnic mix. In countries where 
the government operates with little corruption, the rating is higher.           
■	 A statutory entitlement to healthcare services is insufficient to deliver treatment: people must have 
access to healthcare services. The Health Services Index measures this by asking about difficulties 
in getting an appointment, travel time to a surgery or clinic, waiting time to see a doctor, and the 
cost of charges. On average, 76% of European citizens report that none of these elements is a 
barrier to getting access to health services. Older people and women report relatively few obstacles 
to healthcare services access. Among those with low income, a greater proportion have problems 
claiming treatment to which they are entitled.           
■	 Trust in political institutions varies between the police and legal system, where it is high, and 
parliament and political parties, where it is low. On the whole, Europeans tend to be sceptical 
rather than trustful or distrustful of political institutions. Significant differences in trust arise between 
the EU15 and the NMS12, which reflects the extent to which national governments are seen as 
transparent or relatively corrupt. Within countries, income differences have a considerable impact 
on trust in both political institutions and fellow citizens.     
■	 According to the Economic Tensions Index, a third of EQLS respondents report a lot of tension 
between workers and management, and between rich and poor people. Material circumstances 
chiefly influence the perception of economic tensions: those who are more deprived, have an 
inadequate income or live in worse off regions are more likely to feel a sense of economic tension. 
■	 For the Racial, Ethnic and Religious Tensions Index, 40% of European citizens surveyed perceive 
a lot of tension between different racial and ethnic groups. 31% indicate a lot of tension between 
different religious groups, and 50% see some tension in each area of intergroup relations. The 
national context has a major impact on this index: tension is much higher in the EU15 countries 
than in the NMS12. This may be due to the fact that countries with a high GDP per capita tend to 
attract more migrants from other continents. 
Policy pointers
■	 Given that low income is consistently a cause of individuals having an unfavourable assessment 
of their society, boosting the income of the poorest people should have an impact on how they 
assess public services and access to health care, but also on levels of trust and feelings of economic 
tension.             
■	 Training public officials to show more positive engagement with problems that low-income members 
of society have in dealing with public bureaucracies could improve their access and therefore their 
evaluation of the quality of public services.          
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■	 Increasing trust in public institutions requires reducing perceived corruption – a problem among 
some EU15 countries as well as the NMS12. Governments must strengthen anti-corruption policies 
and their enforcement in order to make procedures more transparent.          
■	 Where neighbourhoods have sub-standard services, service providers should give priority to 
preventing further deterioration and to raising standards to the norm for the city or region as a 
whole.  
■	 It is important for governments to deal with racial, ethnic and religious tensions by introducing 
policies that encourage migrants to develop a good understanding of national norms where they 
live. At the same time, governments should encourage all citizens to appreciate the positive features 
of economic and cultural integration.   
■	 With an overall score of ‘6’ on a 10-point index scale, the average European tends to rate the 
quality of public services positively, while indicating that more could be done to improve the quality 
of society. Combined with the scepticism expressed vis-à-vis political institutions, this result gives 
a clear message to policy makers to let words be followed by action. 

5Introduction
Although ‘society’ is an abstract concept, the public policies that contribute greatly to the quality of 
society are familiar features of daily life. They concern many different aspects of life, from educating 
young people to security of income and health in old age. Public policies are also responsible for 
maintaining the infrastructure of society, ensuring that water and air are not polluted, as well as 
reducing tensions between social groups that differ in their material or cultural circumstances. Because 
of governments’ responsibility for providing such major social services, quality of society and of public 
services cannot be kept apart. In a modern society, the quality of individual life is not just a reflection of 
individual choices and behaviour. It is the sum of what is done by the state, the market, and individuals 
and their households (Rose, 1986). 
The quality of society concerns how individuals and institutions relate to each other. Institutions 
influence the quality of society through collective actions that individuals cannot undertake by 
themselves – for example, maintaining schools, hospitals and roads. Assessing this goes beyond 
assessments of individual happiness, subjective well-being or individual prosperity (see, for example, 
Böhnke, 2005; Wallace et al, 2007; Alber et al, 2008). It is about the extent to which there is a sense 
of social cohesion and social solidarity within European countries.
However, no institution has a monopoly on the services that contribute to the quality of society. 
Important services affecting individuals and households are delivered locally – for instance, by teachers 
and nurses or by refuse collectors. The social partners are involved in the delivery of these services – 
that is, in their role as organised labour, employers and civil society institutions. National governments 
are not only responsible for financing many social services but also for the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities to all members of society. European Union (EU) institutions have the unique 
responsibility for promoting the quality of society across a continent with almost half a billion people. 
The EU’s Renewed Social Agenda focuses on collective quality of society such as social inclusion, 
gender equality, and social solidarity and cohesion (European Commission, 2008).
The aim of advancing the quality of society in Europe today creates fresh challenges in an EU that 
brings together 27 different countries. It also means promoting social cohesion in societies that are 
becoming more diverse internally, as greater numbers of people take advantage of the EU’s promotion 
of the right to work as well as travel across the Union. The financial crisis that started in 2008 raises 
fresh demands to prevent European societies from being divided between insiders who have not been 
immediately affected by the crisis and outsiders who have been. The EU’s success in responding to 
these challenges is also important for its development, insofar as it depends for its legitimacy on its 
effectiveness in promoting the quality of European society (Scharpf, 1999; Majone, 2005). The concern 
of EU institutions goes beyond promoting policies for their own sake. A document of the Bureau of 
European Policy Advisers (Liddle and Lerais, 2007) emphasises: 
Public policy imperatives such as ‘growth and jobs’, the Lisbon strategy and the drive for 
greater competitiveness are not ends in themselves – but means to an end – the well-being 
of European citizens.
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) has a 
clear stake in quality of society, because it brings together the major social partners – that is, employers, 
workers and the government – to bring forward proposals for advancing the quality of society on 
a Europe-wide scale. The European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) has evolved as a major tool for 
providing ideas that address the issue of the quality of society from a distinctive perspective. Instead 
of evaluating what governments are doing, this Eurofound survey asks European citizens to evaluate 
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multiple aspects of quality in society. It uses the familiar and time-tested method of sample surveys 
that interview nationally representative cross-sections of the population in all 27 Member States of the 
European Union (EU27). 
This report draws on the results of the 2007 EQLS in order to develop innovative indexes of the 
quality of societies and public services. It examines the multiple aspects of quality of society because 
statistical analysis shows that society cannot be reduced to a single index number, whether derived 
from public opinion surveys or economic data. The report’s second objective is to identify the extent 
to which quality of society and public services vary between European nations. Since the EQLS results 
also show differences within every country, the report examines the extent to which differences in the 
evaluation of society reflect differences in individual income, gender or age. Consistent with the EU 
priority for social cohesion, the third objective of the report is to highlight policies that could increase 
social cohesion during challenging times in Europe. 
71Beyond monetary measures of quality 
of society
Gross domestic product (GDP) is the most frequently cited indicator of the quality of society. It combines 
different measures of economic activity in a single index number that is intended to describe a country’s 
total economic activity in a particular year and indicate the extent to which the national economy 
has grown since the previous year. The calculation of GDP shows how easy or difficult it will be for 
a government to gain additional tax revenue to avoid a spending deficit. However, statistics of GDP 
per head of population or capita ignore the way in which incomes are distributed around a society’s 
average income. Moreover, GDP cannot readily take into account less tangible goods that are not 
bought and sold in the marketplace, such as clean air or friendships. In principle, welfare economics 
have sought to relate public expenditure to the well-being of individuals in society. Nevertheless, 
instead of defining welfare in terms familiar in everyday life, it is characterised by the abstract concept 
of ‘utility’. It thus risks becoming ‘an uninterrupted stream of logical deductions which are not about 
anything at all’ (Little, 1963, pp. 81ff). 
Public expenditure data are often used to evaluate public policies for education, healthcare, social 
security and other aspects of quality of society. Such an approach assumes that if more money is spent 
on schools, health services or pensions, the services are necessarily better. However, it confuses inputs 
to meet the cost of producing public services – such as the wages of teachers, doctors or the police 
– with benefits that citizens may gain. In fact, there is no one-to-one correlation between the money 
spent on health services and national health or the money spent on policing and safety on the streets. 
There is now a widespread recognition that in order to evaluate the quality of society, it is necessary 
to go beyond ‘the measuring rod of money’ (see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), 2009; Stiglitz et al, 2009). In the succinct judgment of Amartya Sen, an advisor 
to the European Commission, he insists that: ‘Economists and psychologists should try harder to 
understand what people think and how they act in real life’ (quoted in Thornhill, 2009). 
The social indicators movement was launched in the United States (US) to create statistics of ‘direct 
normative interest which facilitate concise, comprehensive and balanced judgments about the conditions 
of major aspects of a society ... If it changes in the “right” direction, while other things remain equal, 
things have got better or people are better off’ (US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
1969; see also Fahey et al, 2004, pp. 9ff). Typically, a social indicator is based on objective measures 
of individual characteristics – such as age, education, household size and housing, or economic status. 
The social indicators movement has stimulated national statistical offices to collate and add to social 
and demographic statistics, such as the British Social Trends statistics. The social element refers to the 
fact that these individual characteristics can be combined to describe the social structure of a society 
in quantitative terms. However, most of these indicators are not about relations between individuals 
in society.
In the past decade, attention has been given to the state of mind of individuals, ‘where people’s 
feelings are treated as paramount’ (Layard, 2005). The chief areas of concern are happiness and life 
satisfaction, or the quality of life in general or in a variety of domains such as health, family or friends 
(see Böhnke, 2005; Huppert et al, 2005; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006; Phillips, 2006; Veenhoven and 
Hagerty, 2006). The New Economic Foundation in London (2008, pp. 2ff) argues that national GDP 
statistics ‘have obscured other vital parts’ of society, including the family, neighbourhood, community 
and biosphere. The Foundation has published a National Accounts of Well-being, using a large number 
of psychological indicators to assess ‘how people feel and experience their lives’. Research on social 
capital, led by Robert Putnam (2000), has emphasised the importance for society of individuals trusting 
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each other. Moreover, the social cohesion programme of the Council of Europe (2009) is promoting 
measures of how people relate to each other in ways that minimise social exclusion and inequality.
In keeping with its mandate, at the beginning of this decade, Eurofound began a long-term programme 
of monitoring the quality of life. The initial concept paper interpreted the term broadly as follows: ‘The 
quality of life in a society can be defined as the overall well-being of those living there’. The quality 
of life is conceived as reflecting both descriptive objective measures of individual conditions and 
subjective evaluations. The approach rejects the idea of a single summary measure of quality of life 
‘because it obscures more than it reveals’ (Fahey et al, 2003, p. 14). Thus, the EQLS ‘focuses broadly 
on quality of life rather than narrowly on living conditions – and sees quality of life primarily in terms 
of the scope that individuals have to achieve their own goals’ (Anderson et al, 2009, p. 1). The first 
EQLS was conducted in 2003, with the advice of a team of European social scientists (see Fahey 
et al, 2004; Daly and Rose, 2007; Alber et al, 2008). The second survey, which is analysed in this 
report, was carried out by the research company TNS opinion, which conducted face-to-face interviews 
beginning in September 2007. In every EU Member State, a representative sample of a minimum of 
1,000 adults were interviewed. In France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom (UK), there 
were between 1,500 and 2,000 respondents (for details of the sample and response rate, see Anderson 
et al, 2009, Annex 2). 
Quality of society and public services are fundamental for the quality of life, but they are not 
identical. Whereas quality of life studies focus on subjective and objective conditions of individuals, 
a consideration of quality of society shifts the focus to collective institutions as well as characteristics 
of society and how individuals relate to them. For example, an individual who wants to be educated 
is not seeking to be self-taught but seeking a good school and university, and a person who needs an 
operation seeks a good hospital. The concept is thus oriented toward collective relationships between 
individuals and public sector and civil society organisations that deliver major services; at the same 
time, it focuses on relationships of trust or tension between major groups in society. 
The EQLS adds value to official statistics because it goes beyond inferring quality of society from 
official statistics on the inputs and outputs of government. Instead, it looks at how these outputs are 
evaluated by their intended recipients. Because the EQLS is independent of national governments, it 
can ask people about aspects of their social life that could be the subject of public policies but that 
have yet to attract the attention of policymakers. The survey thus complements the Eurobarometer, 
which conducts surveys that address priority issues within the European Commission.1 Although the 
EQLS and the European Social Survey (ESS) cover a similar set of countries, the latter concentrates on 
data primarily of concern to sociological research, such as class structure and media use. The World 
Values Survey covers more continents in its waves every five years, but its approach to public policy 
is to ask people what they would like the government to do rather than how they evaluate what the 
government actually does.
The EQLS provides insights into the lives of Europeans by collecting both objective and subjective 
data that go well beyond conventional socioeconomic measures.2 Because the EQLS asks the same 
questions in each of 27 EU Member States, the results provide a benchmark – that is, the average 
view of the whole citizenry of Europe. The evaluation that citizens of any one country give can then be 
compared with the pan-European figure, in order to identify whether a country is above, near or below 
the average for the whole of Europe. 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
2 For the complete survey questionnaire, see http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/areas/qualityoflife/eqlsquest03.pdf 
92Developing indexes to measure quality 
of society and public services
Although an ‘information society’ needs information, the production of data by governments threatens 
to make Europe an information-saturated society. To make sense of the flood of information, data 
needs to be condensed into meaningful pointers about public issues. An index is one such guide, 
clarifying what is happening by combining multiple bits of information into a single numerical scale.
In a complex world, policymakers are increasingly demanding indexes to help diagnose problems 
and target public policies; they are also being used more frequently by the media. Indexes do not 
inform governments what specific policies to adopt, but they do show where fresh action is needed 
to bring substandard conditions up to national standards. The open method of coordination enables 
EU policymakers to assess whether national conditions meet European standards for social cohesion. 
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) of inflation is a familiar example of a policy-relevant index. The CPI 
does not indicate the price of anything in particular: instead, it shows how much a household’s income 
needs to change to keep pace with inflation or, on the rare occasions when it is relevant, deflation. The 
CPI is a number, but it is not a fact – rather, it is a statistical construct. In order to create it, officials 
collect information about the purchasing habits of different types of households and incomes, and 
about prices for baskets of goods in shops in different parts of a particular country. The information is 
then combined in a single index. The result is not a ‘price’ as the term is understood in a supermarket. 
Nonetheless, its release each month produces a headline about how much or how little prices are 
changing. 
Constructing	indexes
The EQLS questionnaire (see footnote 2) covers major topics of importance to society and a number 
of questions are asked about each topic. For example, there are six questions about specific public 
services of central importance for the EU Social Agenda. The topics analysed in this report have been 
selected because they are particularly relevant to the activities of governments today. Other reports 
about the 2007 EQLS survey cover work–family balance, subjective well-being, social exclusion, and 
change and stability in society since the first EQLS four years previously. 
Given the range of questions in the EQLS, a strategic choice must be made about how to combine 
them. If simplicity is the goal, then replies to all questions could be grouped together in a single index. 
However, combining indicators of public services, the neighbourhood environment, trust in politicians 
and tensions in society risks creating a ‘pot-pourri’ index of measures that are different in their causes 
and in the policy responses appropriate for improving them. Thus, to ensure clarity in the meaning of 
each index, the report proceeds on a step-by-step basis to ensure that each index is coherent and deals 
with similar issues.
The first step is to identify a set of questions that appear to be related in their relevance to a given 
concern of Europeans. Respondents from across the continent are pooled together in a single database 
and weighted in accordance with their country’s share of Europe’s population. The second step is to 
examine statistically whether individuals give similar answers to a group of questions. For instance, it 
is assessed whether people are negative about one type of public service, about all services or if they 
evaluate different services differently. Similarly, the survey examines whether people who perceive 
tensions between young and old persons also see tensions between women and men. Factor analysis 
is the appropriate statistical method to test the extent to which evaluations reflect a single underlying 
attitude suitable for combining in an index. 
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Method	of	analysis
Since an index score can be calculated for each respondent, this makes it possible to identify groups of 
citizens who are most and least positive about their society. The data can be used to test the hypothesis 
that who individuals are is of greatest importance in determining the perceived quality of the society in 
which they live. For example, people with more socioeconomic resources are generally more likely to 
have a positive view of society, while those who are low in resources and status will be least positive. 
Empirical analyses of European surveys show substantial support for this hypothesis (Alber et al, 2008; 
Kaase and Newton, 1995; Dalton, 2008). 
Since public services depend on the actions of national government, a second hypothesis argues that 
where an individual lives is important for how they evaluate their society. Thus, people who live in 
countries with a high level of GDP per capita ought to be more satisfied with public services than those 
living in countries that are less well off economically. Similarly, those who live in countries where the 
government is corrupt ought to be less satisfied with what the government does. A substantial amount 
of empirical research exists indicating that quality of society will be higher where the distribution of 
income is more equal (see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Another hypothesis is cultural: 
differences between nations may reflect differences in the values of their citizens, as surmised in 
Huntington’s (1996) thesis on the clash between a homogeneous ‘Western’ culture and an alien Islamic 
culture (see also Inglehart, 1997). 
The two approaches can be combined in a third hypothesis: both who a person is and where they 
live are important influences on individual evaluations of the quality of their society. Taking into 
account differences in socioeconomic resources between individuals avoids the fallacy of assuming that 
everyone in a country thinks the same. Similarly, recognising differences between countries avoids the 
individualist fallacy of assuming that each person evaluates his or her society without regard to their 
national context (Robinson, 1950; Scheuch, 1966). In a survey in a single country, it is not possible to 
test the effect of cross-national differences. Since the EQLS provides data about citizens in every EU 
country, however, it is possible to test the effects of both individual and national differences.
Consecutive chapters in this report develop indexes for evaluating the quality of public services and of 
the local environment, along with access to health services, trust in political institutions and in people, 
and tensions in society. Each chapter starts by reporting the answers to each question used to compile 
the index, and demonstrating its statistical validity. The second step is to describe the degree to which 
index scores differ between countries and between individuals according to their income, age, gender 
and education. Since social characteristics are often interrelated – for example, income and education 
– multivariate statistical analysis is then used to identify the specific social characteristics that have 
the greatest effect on individuals, after controlling for their other attributes. In addition, multilevel 
statistical modelling (see, for example, Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Luke, 2004) is then used to 
test the combined impact of differences in the national context and the socioeconomic differences of 
individuals. 
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In today’s Europe, every government is responsible for delivering a range of public services, and people 
spend far more time consuming outputs of government than they devote to inputting their views at 
election time. Services that are publicly authorised and financed can be delivered by public employees 
in state, regional or local government. They can also be delivered by public and civil society institutions 
such as universities, or by private sector organisations. Before the global economic crisis of 2008, public 
expenditure in the average EU country amounted to 43% of GDP, while taxation was equal to 40% 
of GDP. 
A small number of public services have a large impact on households and individuals throughout 
their lives. Completing more than 10 years of education is now the norm, as is drawing a pension 
for a decade or longer in retirement. Healthcare is relevant throughout the lifecycle. Care for pre-
school children predominantly affects younger families, while care for elderly persons impacts on older 
households. The quality of public transport is important not only to those who use it regularly, but 
also to those who use a car because public transport is deemed inadequate. At any given time, the 
average European household is likely to be directly benefiting from at least two of these major public 
services, while those employed by public institutions and public authorities constitute one quarter of 
the labour force.
Public	Services	Index
The EQLS asked respondents to rate six familiar types of public services: health services, the education 
system, pensions, public transport, childcare services and care for elderly persons. On a 10-point scale, 
with 1 denoting the lowest rating and 10 the highest, the average score for four services – namely, 
public transport, the education system, health services and childcare services – was positive (Figure 
1). However, individual judgments varied substantially around these averages. A total of 67% of 
respondents gave a positive rating of ‘6’ or more for public transport; 66% were positive about the 
education system and health services; and 61% were positive about childcare services. Services for 
older people were nevertheless assessed less favourably. The average rating of care services for elderly 
persons stood at the arithmetic midpoint of the scale (5.5), while it was negative for the pension 
system, which only less than one third of the respondents rated positively (Figure 1). Nonetheless, 
after controlling for the fact that up to one sixth of respondents evaluated services at the psychological 
midpoint of the scale (5), those describing a service as low in quality were a limited minority. 
Since the average ratings for each type of public service are rather similar, this suggests that individuals 
tend to have largely the same opinion about each service rather than discriminating sharply between 
them. This could reflect the fact that a government that either successfully or unsuccessfully delivers one 
service will perform similarly in relation to the other services. It could also indicate people’s tendency 
to express a generalised opinion about the government serving the public interest or being wasteful 
and inefficient. Insofar as individual assessments of public services tend to follow the same pattern, 
the scores for individual services can be combined into a Public Service Index.
To determine whether popular responses reflect a single underlying attitude, a factor analysis was 
undertaken of individual ratings for six types of services (see Annex Table A2). Europeans who express 
a positive attitude towards one type of service are more likely to express a positive opinion about all 
of the other services as well. Conversely, those who are critical of any one service are disposed to be 
critical of others. The six types of services under examination constitute a single principal component 
with a high degree of commonality. To test the robustness of this Public Services Index, separate 
analyses were conducted with the same questions asked in the 2003 EQLS and for respondents in the 
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15 EU Member States (EU15) prior to enlargement in 2004 and the new Member States (NMS) in the 
2007 EQLS. The results are almost identical and justify the creation of a Public Service Index.
Figure	1:	Average	European	evaluation	of	public	services,	by	type	of	service
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Notes: Figures show average value on a 10-point scale; figures in parentheses show standard deviation. Results are based on 
responses to Question 56: ‘In general, how would you rate the quality of each of the following public services in your country 
on a scale from one (very poor quality) to 10 (very high quality)?’ 
The results are weighted by population.
Source: EQLS 2007
The Public Service Index adds every individual’s numerical rating of each public service and divides 
the total by the number of services rated (Figure 2). This controls for ‘don’t know’ replies, which ranged 
from 1% for health services, 5% for public transport and education, to 13% for pensions, 20% for care 
services for elderly people and 24% for childcare. The relatively large number of ‘don’t knows’ for the 
latter groups reflects their age-specific relevance. 
Figure	2:	Distribution	of	ratings	in	Public	Services	Index
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Results are based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = ‘very poor quality’ and 10 = ‘very high quality’, in response to Question 
56. The index gives each individual’s average response to the six public service questions after the exclusion of ‘don’t know’ 
answers. Individual averages are rounded down to the nearest 0.5 in the figure above. 
Source: EQLS 2007
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The median respondent is positive about public services. Overall, 57% of the respondents have an 
index score above the arithmetic midpoint of 5.5. Only 22% show a score which is a point or more 
below the midpoint. However, the spread of evaluations is wide. 
Differences	in	individuals’	evaluation	of	society
Within every European society, differences in resources such as income, education, gender and age 
tend to be associated with differences in how individuals evaluate their society (Alber et al, 2008). 
Figure 3 shows the extent to which individual characteristics affect how people evaluate public services. 
It compares the scores on the Public Service Index of Europeans with higher socioeconomic resources 
and those with lower resources.
Due to problems arising in getting people to reveal their income to survey interviewers3, the EQLS offers 
another measure of financial resources by asking each respondent to say how easy or difficult it is for 
their household ‘to make ends meet’. Only 1% were unwilling to give a reply. 
Figure	3:	Individual	resources	and	Public	Services	Index
Yes No
Adequate income
Yes No Young Old Female Male
Third-level education
10.0
9.0
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
6.2
5.5
6.1
5.8 6.0 5.9 5.9
6.1
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income, third-level education, age and gender. Results are based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = ‘very poor quality’ and 10 = 
‘very high quality’.
Source: EQLS 2007
A total of 62% of respondents report that their income is adequate to meet their expenditure, including 
9% who can very easily make ends meet, 24% who easily do so and 29% who are able to do so fairly 
easily. On the other hand, 5% of respondents have a small degree of difficulty in making ends meet, 
9% report more difficulty and 3% cite great difficulty. As expected, there is a difference of 0.7 of a point 
in the rating of public services between those who say their income is adequate and those who say it 
is not (Figure 3). The marginal nature of the difference is reflected in the fact that a positive rating is 
given to public services by a majority of respondents in both groups.
Education is an important resource, because it not only tends to raise income levels but also provides 
skills useful for obtaining public services – for example, filling out forms and urging teachers and 
3 In response to the EQLS question about household income, 38% of respondents did not give a reply and there were great variations between 
countries in the respondents’ willingness to do so. In Sweden, for example, 9% of respondents did not state their income, while 68% refused 
to do so in Italy.
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doctors to give better care. Having a third-level education – that is, attending a university, polytechnic 
or similar post-secondary institution – seems to be a significant factor in making use of public services 
and 28% of the EQLS respondents have a third-level education. As expected, people in this category 
tend to be more positive in evaluating public services; however, the difference in index scores compared 
with those with less education is only 0.3 of a point on the 10-point scale. 
Differences are also evident in relation to age and respondents’ evaluation of public services. Older 
people are more likely to have immediate concerns about a pension, health services and home care, 
while younger people are more likely to be concerned with education and childcare. Older people 
may also be better at claiming public services because of having greater experience in dealing with 
bureaucratic institutions and, regarding those who are retired, having more time to make claims. 
Moreover, younger people may assess public services against an ideal standard, while older people 
may judge them in comparison to services that were in place a quarter or half century ago. Nonetheless, 
there is only an insignificant 0.1 point difference between the average rating of public services given by 
those under 30 years of age and those aged 65 years or older. 
From a gender perspective, women are more directly involved than men in public services, being more 
likely to work in the health services and education and more often observing how their children are 
treated by these services. Feminists offer the view that women, even when having equal legal rights 
with men, will be less favoured by public services. This is clearly the case in the allocation of seats in 
parliaments where policy decisions are endorsed. However, no difference is evident between men and 
women in their evaluation of public services, with both sexes showing the same average score of 5.9. 
While it could be expected that how people evaluate age-specific services reflects where they are in 
their lifecycle, the average rating of the quality of education services among those with children (6.3) 
is virtually the same as that for those without children (6.2). Similarly, the average evaluation of 
parents in relation to childcare services (6.2) is similar to that of those who do not have children (6.0). 
Pensions, care for elderly persons and healthcare are three public services that are particularly relevant 
to older people. The EQLS finds that people aged 65 years or older, who are more likely to use these 
services, are also more positive about such facilities. For example, the average rating among older 
people regarding the state pension is higher (5.2) compared with the average score for those below the 
age of 65 years (4.7). Similarly, the evaluation of care for elderly persons among those aged 65 years 
and over is slightly higher (5.8) than the average score for those below that age (5.5). Among persons 
over 65 years of age, for whom healthcare services can literally be a matter of life or death, the average 
rating of health services is also slightly higher (6.4) that the score for those aged 18–64 years (6.1). In 
short, the social group most likely to have up-to-date experience of specific public services tends to 
give a higher rating for such services. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is an appropriate statistic for identifying which individual 
resources are significant for satisfaction with public services. The results reported in Annex Table A3 
show that people with an adequate income are more satisfied with public services. Age, education and 
living in an urban area are also statistically significant, although their effects are small. No significant 
relationship is evident between gender and how citizens perceive the quality of their public services. 
Cross-country	comparison
The EU Member States differ in their national histories: some are long established democracies, while 
others were part of the Soviet-dominated Communist bloc until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
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Differences are also evident in economic resources between northern and southern Europe, as well as 
between western and eastern Europe. The length of time that countries have been EU members varies 
between the EU15 countries, which include six founding members of the EU, and the 12 NMS countries 
that joined the EU in either 2004 or 2007. 
Citizens in the EU15 countries consistently tend to give a higher rating for each public service (see 
Annex Table A4). For education and childcare, the average scores of the NMS are not significantly 
lower than the rating for the EU15 counties. However, for public transport, the score in the NMS is 
slightly lower (6.1) than the average rating in the EU15 countries (6.4). The same is true in relation to 
care for elderly people (at 5.0 in the NMS compared with 5.7 in the EU15), as well as with regard to 
state pensions (at 4.2 compared with 5.0 in the NMS and EU15 respectively). 
Differences between countries are reflected in the overall Public Service Index score (Figure 4). Two 
thirds of countries are above the midpoint index score (5.5). Only Bulgaria and Greece are below the 
psychological midpoint (5). On the 10-point Public Services Index, there is only half a point’s difference 
in the average of the EU15 countries and the NMS. The distance between the highest ranking country, 
Finland (7.5), and the lowest, Bulgaria (4.5), is large. However, some degree of overlap is also evident 
between the EU15 and the NMS: respondents in 11 out of the 12 NMS countries give their public 
services a higher rating than people living in Greece and Portugal do. 
Figure	4:	Average	Public	Services	Index	score,	by	country
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Comparing European societies by the country name emphasises their national distinctiveness, whereas 
doing so by generic attributes such as GDP differentiates countries according to a common measure. 
This turns differences of kind into differences in degree. Within the EU, differences in GDP per capita 
are substantial. Even after adjusting for purchasing power differences, at the time of the 2007 EQLS 
the range was between €9,300 in Bulgaria and €37,400 in Ireland, and higher still in the unusual 
circumstances of Luxembourg. However, the wealth of a country is not the only determinant of 
investment in public services: equally important is the percentage of GDP that is allocated to public 
expenditure.
It could be expected that the higher the proportion of GDP expenditure on public services, the greater 
the level of popular satisfaction on the Public Services Index. However, Figure 5 shows that this is 
not the case and that there is no significant association between the two. Instead of a straight line 
correlation, many countries are higher on one indicator and lower on the other. For example, Hungary 
is well above the European average in public expenditure as a percentage of GDP, but its Public 
Service Index is below the EU average. Conversely, Estonia and Spain are relatively low in their level 
of public expenditure but their Public Service Index scores are relatively high. This implies that how a 
government spends money on public services may be as important as how much it spends.
Figure	5:	Relationship	between	public	expenditure	and	quality	of	public	services,	by	country	
60
50
40
30
3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0
Public Services Index: average score
Pu
bl
ic
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
s 
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
BG
EL
PT
LV
RO
IT
HU
CY
PL
LT
SK
IE
DE
SI
UK
EE
CZ
ES
FR
NL
SE
AT
BE
DK
MT
LU
FI
Notes: The Public Services Index reflects the aggregated average scores for each of the EU27 Member States, based on a 
10-point scale where 1 = ‘very poor quality’ and 10 = ‘very high quality’. Public expenditure is calculated as a percentage of 
GDP in 2007. Correlation (r) = .30
Sources: EQLS 2007; Eurostat, 2009 and government finance statistics
Combining	individual	and	national	influences
The perception of government corruption in a country may reduce satisfaction with public services among 
citizens who think that these services are being run for private benefit. Transparency International4 
annually compiles a Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), rating all 27 EU Member States on a scale 
from 0 (perceived highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption). At the time of 
the second EQLS, the countries ranking highest on the 10-point CPI were Denmark and Finland (9.4), 
4 See http://www.transparency.org 
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while those ranking lowest were Romania (3.7) and Bulgaria (4.2). One of the EU15 Member States, 
Greece, ranked lower on the CPI than nine of the NMS countries. Moreover, how national income is 
distributed among the population can also affect popular attitudes (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). The 
Gini Index of Income Inequality is internationally recognised as a measure of income distribution. On 
a scale ranging from 0 (absolute equality) to 100 (absolute inequality), the average Gini Index for the 
EU Member States at 29 tends towards the objective of income equality. Among the EQLS countries, 
the Gini Index ranges from 38 in Portugal to 22 in Sweden. 
The breadth of the EQLS questionnaire makes it possible to test a variety of individual attributes and 
attitudes that in theory might influence how people evaluate public services. However, many measures 
included in a statistical analysis could prove to be lacking in substantive or statistical significance; such 
measures have been screened out in preliminary OLS regression analyses using dozens of independent 
variables. The multilevel modelling analyses in this chapter, and subsequent chapters, focus on those 
influences that have a notable impact on an index or that are important to include as they fail to have 
the expected impact. If indicators of national context are highly correlated with each other, then to 
avoid multicollinearity and unreliable results, only one indicator can be included in the multilevel 
modelling analysis (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Luke, 2004). GDP per capita correlates strongly with 
the Transparency International CPI (r: 0.85) and with being an indicator of the national context of the 
EU15 Member States. The CPI is used here since it is a direct measure of the quality of public services. 
As the Gini Index of Income Inequality does not correlate with the Transparency International index 
of perceived corruption, it too can be used to assess the effect of national context.5
The multilevel model confirms the need to take both individual and national differences into account, 
because it can explain much more of the variation in the evaluation of public services than national 
comparisons or simple correlations between four socioeconomic attributes can6 (compare Annex Tables 
A3 and A5). Controlling for the effect of a host of influences shows that some influences which might, 
on a priori grounds, be considered important – such as whether a person lives in an urban or rural 
setting – fail to achieve statistical significance. Moreover, the impact of the seven statistically significant 
influences varies substantially in scale and direction.7 
The extent to which a national government delivers services transparently or corruptly has the 
biggest impact on the quality of public services (Figure 6). In countries where public officials act in a 
bureaucratic way – that is, delivering education, health services, pensions and other services according 
to the rules – the Public Services Index increases by 1.31 points, compared with the countries where a 
substantial degree of corruption is reported. If people receive public services without any expectation 
of the need to pay ‘gratitude money’, they ought to be more satisfied with their public services. Even 
if individuals are not subject to extortion, the fact that the media and informal conversations refer to 
corruption will diminish popular evaluations (Mishler and Rose, 1997). 
5 When the multilevel model analyses reported here were re-run replacing the Transparency International CPI with national GDP per capita, the 
effect of GDP consistently appeared to be insignificant or less significant than that of the CPI.
6 For statistical reasons, when analysing survey data, the amount of variance explained between individuals (R2) appears lower than the same 
figure calculated for aggregates such as countries. As a general rule of thumb, as the value of R2 rises above 10%, the impact is increasingly 
substantial; as it falls below 10%, the influence is lower.
7 The impact of a significant variable is calculated by multiplying its unstandardised b coefficient (see Annex Table A5) by the difference between 
its highest and lowest numerical value as reported in Annex Table A1. For a dichotomous independent variable, such as gender, the impact 
and the b coefficient are the same. For a variable with a range of values – for example, between 0 and 6 for the degree of deprivation in a 
household – the impact is calculated by multiplying the b coefficient of -0.049 by 6.
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Figure	6:	Major	influences	on	Public	Services	Index,	by	multilevel	model
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Whereas pervasive inequities in public administration reduce the quality of public services, the Gini 
Index of Income Inequality fails to have any statistical significance (see Annex Table A5). As far as 
the evaluation of public services is concerned, equity in public administration is significantly more 
important than equality in income distribution. The limited influence of GDP is confirmed by a more 
fine-grained measure, the regional level of economic development, which fails to have a statistically 
significant impact. After controlling for all other influences, people who live in poor regions are just as 
likely to be positive about public services as those who live in the most prosperous regions; the same 
is also true for rural and urban dwellers (see Annex Table A5).
Individual resources are also significant, the most important ones being economic resources. The 
more adequate a household’s income is, the more likely people are to be positive about public 
services. For instance, people who can easily buy what they need rate public services at 1.12 points 
higher than those who have major economic difficulties. Moreover, insofar as an inadequate income 
leads to deprivation of food, clothing or other necessities (see Anderson et al, 2009, pp. 8ff), this 
further diminishes evaluations of public services. Thus, even where public services are transparently 
administered, people who are economically well off are more satisfied with public services. Their status 
may secure better treatment within the rules, while those who are worst off financially are treated fairly 
but may sometimes be treated peremptorily. 
It could be expected that people who are more politically and socially integrated in their society would 
be able to use their social capital to garner better treatment from public officials. Insofar as this is the 
case, people who are more educated and have more political contacts ought to be more positive about 
public services. However, the opposite is the case. Persons with a third-level education give public 
services a lower rating than those with less education. Similarly, those who have the most political 
contacts assign public services a lower rating than those who have no such contacts. This surprising 
finding could be related to the fact that those with more education and political involvement may 
have higher expectations of what public services should be like. This interpretation is complemented 
by the finding that those who regularly attend church give public services a more charitable – that is, 
positive – rating. After controlling for other socioeconomic characteristics, older people – who depend 
on a variety of public services – do not differ significantly from younger people on the Public Services 
Index. Moreover, no significant difference is evident between the evaluations of men and women. 
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The increased mobility of people in today’s EU has resulted in a changing population in many countries, 
with a greater mixture of longstanding citizens, migrants and those with immigrant parents. In the 
EQLS, some 87% of respondents reported that both parents and they themselves were natives of the 
country. Even though long-established citizens would be expected to have more advantages in claiming 
public services, they are not more positive about such services: instead, after controlling for all other 
characteristics, they tend to view public services a little less favourably than the 13% of respondents 
who are, or whose parent was, a migrant from another country or continent. 
Overall, nevertheless, most Europeans have a positive view of the quality of their public services. 
While few are so uncritical as to rate services at the top of a 10-point scale, those who are positive 
are in the majority and substantially outnumber people who are consistently negative. Moreover, the 
average citizen is positive about public services in a large majority of EU Member States. Within this 
broadly favourable picture, however, there are some negative findings – most significantly, in relation 
to the ratings of pensions and of care for elderly persons. Since this view tends to be held across all 
age groups in the European countries, it is not simply a reflection of the dissatisfaction expressed by 
an interest group comprising only old people.
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4Local environment and crime
Neighbourhoods are face-to-face communities. People do not need to turn on the television to see what 
is happening in their neighbourhood; they can find out by walking outside their home to observe the 
effect of public services on the local environment. Notwithstanding the importance for each household 
of clean air and water, in modern societies individuals cannot provide these services for themselves. 
They are collective environmental services for which public institutions are responsible. The principle 
of subsidiarity assigns responsibilities for these services to multiple levels of government. The EU 
is responsible for policies that can directly affect the quality of the environment, and living and 
working conditions – responsibilities that are often shared with national governments. However, local 
government and local providers are responsible for delivering many services, such as safety on the 
streets and access to green spaces that contribute greatly to well-being in the neighbourhood in which 
people spend their daily lives. 
Index	of	neighbourhood	environment	services
The EQLS questionnaire asks participants to indicate whether or not they have reasons to complain 
about the standard of services that affect where they live – that is, the immediate neighbourhood of 
their home. As local services are on their doorstep, people are particularly well qualified to judge them. 
The six topics covered are as follows: noise, air pollution, access to recreational or green areas, water 
quality, crime, violence or vandalism, and litter or rubbish on the street. The degree of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction is measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from ‘very many reasons to complain’ (1) to 
‘no reason at all to complain’ (4). 
Even though the phrasing of the question explicitly refers to complaints, across the EU an absolute 
majority of respondents indicate that they have no reason at all to complain about the different 
elements of the local environment in their neighbourhood. A total of 66% of respondents had no 
complaints about access to green areas, 65% had no problem with water, 56% cited no complaints 
about noise or about air pollution, 53% had no concerns about crime, while 52% had no complaint 
about litter. Less than one fifth of the respondents expressed many or very many complaints about 
any aspect of the environment. Hence, the average rating for each neighbourhood characteristic is very 
positive: on a 4-point scale, Europeans rate each aspect at either 3.3 or 3.4 (Figure 7). 
Figure	7:	Evaluation	of	neighbourhood	quality,	by	type	of	service	
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Notes: Results are based on responses to Question 54: ‘Please think about the area where you live now – I mean the 
immediate neighbourhood of your home. Do you have very many reasons, many reasons, a few reasons, or no reason at all to 
complain about each of the following problems?’ 
Responses are given on a 4-point scale, where 4 = ‘no reason to complain’ and 1 = ‘very many reasons to complain’.
Source: EQLS 2007
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The similarity of evaluations for each environmental measure implies that individual judgments reflect 
an overall pattern, and a factor analysis confirms that all six measures can be combined into a single 
Neighbourhood Services Index. There is a single principal component: the loadings for each item 
are between 0.64 and 0.80, reflecting a high degree of commonality (see Annex Table A2). Separate 
factor analyses for the EU15 countries and the NMS show similar results, and the same holds true for 
neighbourhood quality covered in the 2003 as well as the 2007 EQLS.
The Neighbourhood Services Index adds each individual’s rating of each public service and divides the 
total by the number of services rated – this controls for ‘don’t know’ replies, which were consistently 
1% or less, except in relation to tap water (1.2%). In turn, it produces an index score that can range 
from 4.0 for a person with no complaints about any of the services to 1.0 for a person who has many 
complaints about all of these services. The largest group (42% of respondents) completely endorse 
their neighbourhood, with no reason to complain about any aspects of the local environment. The 
median respondent’s score falls between having no reason to complain and a few reasons to complain. 
However, agreement is not complete among Europe’s citizens: one in six of the respondents usually 
finds at least a few reasons to complain, while a small proportion have many reasons to complain 
about their local environment.
Individual	resources	and	neighbourhood	quality
Of four major socioeconomic characteristics, economic circumstances have the biggest impact: people 
who can meet their monthly expenditure without difficulty have fewer complaints about the quality of 
their neighbourhood services. The average score for those with an adequate income is 3.5, while the 
score for people having problems in making ends meet is slightly lower at 3.2. People who live in rural 
areas are also more likely to be satisfied with the services provided in their local environment (Figure 
8). While statistically significant, these differences are in degree, not in kind. Similarly, in terms of 
crime, those who are better off are more likely to say that they have no complaint about crime in their 
neighbourhood (89%) than those who have economic difficulties (80%), while those who live in cities 
rather than rural areas are more likely to complain about crime. Educated people are no more likely to 
Figure	8:	Relationship	between	individual	resources	and	Neighbourhood	Services	Index	
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be satisfied by the quality of their neighbourhood than those without a third-level education; the same 
is true regarding the evaluation of crime. 
Age is also associated with satisfaction with the local neighbourhood (Figure 8). Older people are 
slightly more satisfied with their neighbourhood, perhaps because they have had more time to buy a 
home of their choice in a place of their choice. The difference may also reflect older people’s readiness 
to become accustomed to their surroundings and accept them. However, the difference is slight, at only 
0.2 of a point on the Neighbourhood Services Index. Similarly, the age difference is only 0.1 of a point 
in relation to crime.
Women are likely to spend more time in their local neighbourhood than men for the following 
reasons: fewer women participate in the labour market, women spend more time looking after the 
local activities of children, and women live longer than men. Nonetheless, greater familiarity with the 
local neighbourhood, and other differences associated with gender, do not affect the assessments: the 
average score for women and men is the same (3.4) on the Neighbourhood Services Index (Figure 8). 
To control for the association between socioeconomic characteristics, five potential influences were 
included in a multiple regression analysis calculating their effect on the Neighbourhood Services 
Index. This found that people who live in urban areas are more likely to make some complaints 
about neighbourhood services than people who live in rural areas. Household income also has a 
significant influence on neighbourhood evaluations, while age and education have less influence on 
neighbourhood satisfaction. Altogether, these socioeconomic influences accounted for 11.5% of the 
variation in satisfaction with neighbourhood services. A similar regression about complaints concerning 
crime also found that urban residence was a major cause of dissatisfaction; however, this could be 
offset to some extent by those with a higher income living in neighbourhoods where local services gave 
fewer reasons to complain about crime (Annex Table A3). 
Cross-country	comparison
When countries are compared on the Neighbourhood Services Index, there is a tendency for countries 
to group together near the top of the scale, with the overall average standing at 3.4 on the 4-point scale. 
In the EU15 countries and the NMS, the average scores are close, being only –0.2 of a point apart; 
this also holds true for crime. A few countries stand out from the average. In Denmark and Finland, 
the overall index score is only 0.2 of a point from total satisfaction with services. On the other hand, in 
Bulgaria and Italy, the average index score is a full point below the top rating (Figure 9).
Four decades of rapid industrialisation that has lacked regard for environmental concerns has left 
a mark on neighbourhoods in 10 EU Member States that were once part of the Communist bloc. In 
these countries, a majority of respondents voice at least a few complaints regarding litter, crime, water 
quality, noise and air pollution. However, only a small minority have a large number of complaints 
about these services. In the EU15, a consistent majority of respondents say they have no complaints 
– nonetheless, the minority voicing concerns is also substantial. Thus, the difference between the two 
groups of countries is not that large overall. The gap is only eight percentage points for complaints 
about crime, because crime is a concern in the EU15 as well as in the NMS. 
Given the cost of providing public services to keep neighbourhoods free of pollution and provide green 
spaces, it would be expected that the higher the percentage of GDP expenditure on public services in a 
country, the better the quality of neighbourhood services. However, there is no significant association 
between public expenditure and a country’s average score on the neighbourhood index (r: 0.23). With 
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regard to crime, a negative and insignificant correlation of -0.25 emerges between a country’s GDP 
expenditure and the perception of crime in a neighbourhood. 
Combining	individual	and	national	influences
The same multilevel statistical methods are used as before to identify what accounts for differences in 
the way in which individuals evaluate their neighbourhood with one addition: an index of the extent to 
which people complain about their housing. This index is composed of answers to six EQLS questions 
about shortage of space, structural faults and related problems in respondents’ accommodation. Since 
people are as satisfied with their housing as they are with their neighbourhood, it is possible that they 
project these feelings onto their evaluation of the local environment.8 The multilevel models confirm 
that both individual and national characteristics influence people’s evaluation of neighbourhood 
quality (Figure 10). 
Where people live has a big effect on how they evaluate their local environment. In particular, the 
effects of differences within a country and between neighbourhoods within an urban area have a 
8 To verify that there were not a number of factors affecting neighbourhood quality that did not influence national public services, additional 
regressions were conducted with many potentially important influences. Since they were of little or no significance, they are not included in the 
final analysis reported here.
Figure	9:	Average	scores	on	Neighbourhood	Services	Index,	by	country
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substantial impact. Although urban areas have economies of scale compared with rural areas, in urban 
areas the 4-point Neighbourhood Services Index is more than a quarter of a point lower. This rating 
appears to reflect the scale of the challenge confronting urban governments. For example, even though 
police forces are larger and have more sophisticated equipment in urban areas, they also face more 
crime.
Figure	10:	Multilevel	model	of	influences	on	views	of	neighbourhood	services
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Within an urban area, neighbourhoods differ between those that are stable and those that are in 
transition because of the opening up of national societies to people migrating from other countries 
or continents. When the EQLS asked respondents to characterise their local neighbourhood, some 
53% indicated that hardly anyone is of a race or ethnic group different from the majority of people in 
their country. A further one third stated that some people are different, while 11% reported that many 
people in their neighbourhood differ in race or ethnicity from the majority of citizens in the country. 
The reference to race and ethnicity indicates that mixed neighbourhoods are likely to have immigrants 
from other continents, such as North Africa or Pakistan, more than transnational migrants from within 
the EU or Roma in the NMS. People living in a racially or ethnically mixed neighbourhood give a 
Neighbourhood Services Index rating of more than one quarter of a point lower. These views are not 
greatly affected by whether people are long-term residents whose parents along with themselves are 
born in the country. Tensions appear to be generated by changes in a neighbourhood due to people 
moving in who are not the same as residents’ former neighbours. If openness to newcomers is due 
to the neighbourhood having previously been disadvantaged in the quality of its services, this is an 
additional source of complaint. 
After controlling for all other characteristics, the condition of a person’s house has an impact on 
how they rate their neighbourhood. The EQLS collects six different indicators of the conditions of a 
respondent’s house – for example, whether there is a shortage of space, problems with dampness and 
lack of a toilet. Up to a point, these conditions are integral to the accommodation itself. On the other 
hand, households can take the initiative to improve the conditions in which they live, either through 
do-it-yourself (DIY) work on a house with poor conditions or by moving elsewhere. Not surprisingly, 
the very small percentage of Europeans who find themselves in poor housing are less likely to give their 
neighbourhood a positive rating (Figure 10). 
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The economic conditions of a neighbourhood, particularly in an urban area, cannot be separated from 
the region of which it is a part. The allocation of structural funds to regions is a major activity of the EU. 
The EQLS classifies regions by the extent to which their GDP per capita is above, at or below the EU 
average. As local labour markets and economic opportunities differ within as well as between countries, 
these factors have the potential to offer a more finely-grained description of an individual’s economic 
context than the national GDP. However, the multilevel model analysis finds that regional economic 
conditions do not have a significant influence on quality of the local environment. In other words, 
there is no significant risk that regional prosperity or depression affect the individual evaluations of 
people’s neighbourhood. Since there are many diverse neighbourhoods within a region, to be effective 
in improving neighbourhood conditions policies must be targeted at narrowly defined neighbourhoods 
within cities as well as at the larger compass of a region. 
The indirect effects that EU and national institutions have on neighbourhood quality through policies 
delivered at the local level by local authorities and social partners include the degree of integrity at the 
national level. In countries where the integrity of national government is highest on the Transparency 
International CPI, the Neighbourhood Services Index is a full half point higher. In as much as citizens 
tend to judge the integrity of government without regard to distinctions between national and local 
behaviour, this implies that corruption, whatever the level, increases the complaints that people make 
about how government provides neighbourhood services. Moreover, those who have more political 
contacts – and who should thus be more knowledgeable about public services – tend to have more 
complaints about their neighbourhood (Figure 10). 
Income and age are the individual resources that have an impact on how people evaluate their 
neighbourhood. Unsurprisingly, the more adequate a person’s income is, the more likely they are to be 
positive about their neighbourhood (Figure 10). Similarly, older people also tend to be more positive 
about their local services. However, the impact of each is less than that of urban conditions generally 
and of living in a neighbourhood that is very mixed ethnically and racially.
For each measure of the quality of the neighbourhood environment, citizens tend to be positive: the 
average European has no complaints about rubbish collection, air and noise pollution, access to 
recreation and green areas, or crime. However, within each country, there are some neighbourhoods 
where many residents have complaints about local services. Since these services are delivered to 
neighbourhoods that can readily be mapped, improving neighbourhood services involves targeting 
places rather than people, as is the case with pensions or health services. 
The multilevel analysis shows that even though problems are associated with cities, they are not 
distributed evenly throughout a metropolitan area: they are found in some of its neighbourhoods but 
not in others. Complaints are significantly fewer in neighbourhoods that are ethnically homogeneous. 
Such neighbourhoods are likely to have settled populations, where people know and can cooperate with 
each other and where public agencies have established routines to maintain neighbourhood standards 
(Putnam, 2007; see also American Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative 
Politics (APSA-CP), 2009). The higher level of complaints in ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods 
does not appear to be due to ‘nativism’ or racism, since people who are not long-term citizens of a 
country are almost as likely to complain about neighbourhood services as those who are. This suggests 
that providers of neighbourhood services tend to give lower quality services to neighbourhoods that are 
becoming multi-ethnic. In addition, people living in countries where the government tends to be corrupt 
rather than transparent have substantially more complaints about their neighbourhood environment. 
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5Access to health services
The health of individuals reflects their social environment as well as their biological age (World Health 
Organization (WHO), 2008). Every EU Member State maintains a national health service that is, 
along with social security, the largest and fastest growing claimant on tax revenues. Moreover, 5% or 
more of each country’s workforce is directly or indirectly employed in providing health services. WHO 
(2008) has documented substantial social inequalities in health within as well as between countries 
(see Anderson et al, 2009, Chapter 6). For this reason, the health strategy of the European Commission 
(2007) makes the reduction in health inequalities a priority. The EQLS allows for analysis of the extent 
to which there are also substantial inequalities in access to health services.
Index	of	access	to	health	services	
No one can be sure when they will need to see a doctor or require hospital treatment; but even people 
who do not make use of health services for some years gain a sense of security in knowing that 
services are at hand whenever their health requires it. However, there are legal, economic, practical 
and psychological obstacles to receiving treatment.
Legislation establishing a national health service sets out conditions of eligibility and, conversely, 
exclusion. Individuals or their employer may be required to pay a monthly contribution for health 
insurance or face long waits for means-tested treatment. Many national programmes ask health service 
users to pay for a proportion of their treatment; charges can thus discourage poorer users. Distance 
from a doctor’s office or a hospital can be another obstacle to access. Difficulties in seeing a doctor at 
a time that does not conflict with people’s hours of employment can be a further hindrance. Among 
other barriers to care, people may be hesitant about consulting a doctor because they feel socially 
inadequate in the presence of medical professionals. 
The EQLS asked respondents four questions about obstacles to getting treatment that they might have 
experienced when they last needed to see a doctor. The questions relate to cost, the distance to travel 
for treatment, problems of getting an appointment and waiting in a medical office. For half to almost 
three quarters of Europeans, their national health service provided ready access (Table 1). The fact that 
73% of the respondents do not consider distance as an obstacle shows that the health service, like the 
post office, is a nationwide service. The lower majorities of responses for getting an appointment and 
being seen by a doctor reflect the reality that queuing is a consequence of high demand for treatment 
in relation to the facilities available. The constraints of time are more of an obstacle than a shortage of 
money, as those who view charges for treatment as a problem are significantly fewer than the minority 
who consider the time taken to be treated as a difficulty. Insofar as people do perceive obstacles, they 
are usually described as causing a little rather than a lot of difficulty (Table 1). Only 5% of respondents 
Table	1:	Evaluation	of	access	to	health	services	
Very	difficult	(%) A	little		
difficult	(%)
No	difficultly	(%) Average	 Standard	
deviation
Distance 5 22 73 2.7 0.6
Cost	of	seeing	a	doctor 9 23 68 2.6 0.7
Difficult	to	get	an	appointment 13 29 58 2.5 0.7
Waiting	time	to	see	doctor 13 33 54 2.4 0.7
Notes: Results are based on responses to Question 47: ‘On the last occasion you needed to see a doctor or medical specialist, 
to what extent did each of the following factors make it difficult for you to do so?’ (1 = ‘very difficult’; 2 = ‘some difficulty’;  
3 = ‘no difficulty’)
Those who replied ‘don’t know’ or who did not need to see a doctor were excluded.
Source: EQLS 2007
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cited distance as a significant difficulty, while 9% viewed cost as a big obstacle and 13% found that 
getting an appointment or waiting in a medical office made treatment very difficult. The 9% who did 
not answer these questions because they had not seen a doctor for a long time were excluded from the 
calculations in this chapter.
Each individual tends to make largely the same judgment about each of the steps involved in getting 
healthcare. A factor analysis identifies a single principal component in which individual replies for all 
four steps score very highly (see Annex Table A2). Factor analyses in the EU15 and NMS reach the 
same conclusion. Moreover, the commonality in attitudes is found to be consistent in a factor analysis 
of the same questions in the 2003 EQLS. Since individuals tend to evaluate access to health services 
similarly, an Access to Health Services Index can be created by assigning each alternative a numerical 
score – that is, 1 for ‘very difficult’, 2 for ‘some difficulty’ and 3 for ‘no difficulty’; the scores are then 
added and divided by the number of questions answered.
According to the results, health services seem to be readily available to a substantial majority of the 
population: 39% have no difficulty regarding any of the four points and 28% only have a little difficulty 
with one step. However, ease of access is not universal. More than one in five respondents found that 
getting treatment presented at least some difficulty, while over one in 10 reported that getting treatment 
presented a lot of difficulty. 
Individual	resources	and	access	to	health	services
The goal of health policy is to make care services available to those who need them most, but those 
low in social resources may face obstacles to access. For example, people in bad health can find even 
short distances an obstacle to getting treatment they need. Poor people are not only likely to have 
poorer health but may also find even limited charges for the use of health services a greater hindrance 
than those with more income. On the other hand, those with the highest incomes may balk at the time 
taken to get treatment, since ‘time is money’ and they earn more money. 
Economic circumstances make a significant difference for accessing health services. Those who say their 
income is adequate have an average index rating of 2.6, while those with a lower income have a rating 
of 2.4 (Figure 11). Educated people are more likely to be at ease in dealing with health professionals 
Figure	11:	Relationship	between	individual	resources	and	access	to	health	services
2.6
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.5 2.5
2.6
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Yes No
Adequate income
Yes No Young Old Female Male
Third-level education
Note: Results are based on the Access to Health Services Index, where 1 = ‘very difficult’, 2 = ‘a little difficult’ and 3 = ‘no 
difficulty’; the scores are then added and divided by the number of questions answered to get the average figure.
Source: EQLS 2007
Access	to	health	services
29
and health bureaucrats who control access. As the results show, those with a third-level education 
have an average score which is 0.2 of a point higher on the 3-point Access to Health Services Index 
compared with those without an education. There is also a slight gender difference: the average score 
for women on the index is 0.1 of a point lower than that for men.
Among adults, there is a strong relationship between age and the need for healthcare, since older 
people tend to be less healthy and more likely to need medical treatment. However, older people also 
have more free time. On the Access to Health Services Index, there is only 0.1 of a point difference 
between young Europeans and those over 65 years of age (Figure 11). However, the EQLS finds that 
whatever the respondents’ age, 59% of those in the worst health report at least some difficulty in 
accessing a doctor or hospital, compared with 24% of persons in the best health. Physical infirmities 
are not the chief cause of difficulties in accessing health services: four fifths of those who report great 
difficulties say that their health is good or very good.
An OLS regression analysis controls for the inter-correlations between income, education, age and 
gender (see Annex Table A3). Sufficient income has the strongest influence on access to health services. 
After controlling for its influence, education still has a notable effect, while gender has a significant but 
very weak effect. After taking these differences into account, older people are not significantly different 
from younger people in their experience of difficulties in accessing health services. 
Cross-country	comparison
Effective access to health services is a key consideration of policies on social protection at EU level; it 
is also a priority of health policy in the Member States. The EQLS finds that access to health services 
tends to be high in almost every EU country. On the 3-point Access to Health Services Index, the 
average rating is 2.5, and access differs by only 0.1 of a point above or below that for the established 
EU15 countries and the 12 NMS (see Annex Figure A1). Very little variation exists between or within 
EU countries in access to health services.
The biggest cross-national difference in access to health services is found among established EU 
Member States. In Italy, the average score of 2.1 indicates that the majority of Italians reported a little 
difficulty in getting medical treatment. By contrast, in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, 
the average score of 2.8 shows that the great majority of their populations had no difficulty in access. 
Health services make big claims on public finances. For example, it is a costly process achieving equal 
access for all persons by locating clinics in rural areas and having sufficient hospital staff and beds to 
minimise the time spent waiting for operations. Therefore, it would be expected that citizens of the more 
prosperous countries and the Member States spending a higher proportion of the national income on 
health would also report better access to health services. Although national ratings of access to health 
services do correlate at the aggregate level with a country’s GDP per capita, the relationship is smaller 
than the correlation with the Transparency International measure of corruption. This is a reminder 
that how public money is spent, as well as how much is spent, influences citizens’ ability to access the 
healthcare to which they are formally entitled. 
Combining	individual	and	national	influences
The multilevel model analysis confirms that most people in the EU can access health services without 
major obstacles. Among the 14 potential influences, nine fail to register statistical significance. The 
five significant influences have a limited effect in accounting for variations in access, compared with 
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the influence of economic and social conditions on the Public Services Index and the Neighbourhood 
Services Index.9
Individual income has the biggest impact on access to health services. Having an income that is more 
than adequate boosts access by about 0.25 of an index point, while being deprived of a considerable 
amount of material resources hinders access by a similar amount (Figure 12). Thus, while people who 
are most prosperous have no difficulties in accessing health services, those who are worst off usually 
have at least a little difficulty in accessing such services. The importance of differences in individual 
income is underscored by the fact that, after controlling for the effect of individual differences, the 
amount of public expenditure on health per capita does not have a statistically significant influence on 
access to health services. Insofar as national GDP is important, its effect on access is indirect; higher 
national GDP increases the proportion of people with an adequate income, which in turn makes access 
to health services easier. Similarly, the level of individual income appears to be more important than a 
country’s inequality of income, since national Gini indexes have no significant relationship with access 
(see Annex Table A7). 
Figure	12:	Multilevel	model	of	major	influences	on	access	to	health	services
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Age does not have a significant impact on access to health services. Nonetheless, older people are more 
experienced in using health services than younger persons. Retired people also have more time to wait 
in a doctor’s office. After controlling for the effect of age and income, women are slightly more likely to 
report a little difficulty in accessing health services (Figure 12). 
Although health services, such as hospitals, are not so widely dispersed as primary schools, neither the 
national nor the regional context is significant for accessing health services. Since the Transparency 
International CPI had no significant influence on access to health services, it was not included in the 
multivariate analysis. The notion that favouritism does not affect access is confirmed by the fact that 
people with more political contacts actually appear to be less likely to get medical treatment without 
9 The pseudo R2, a standard measure of how much difference a set of independent variables makes, accounts for 10.9% of the variance in the 
Access to Health Services Index, compared with 20.4% in the Neighbourhood Services Index and 19.4% in the Public Services Index.
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any difficulty (Figure 12). Since better hospitals and specialised treatments are more often available in 
cities, urbanisation could affect access; however, this link is also insignificant. Although the racial and 
religious heterogeneity of a neighbourhood is significant, the impact is slight, lowering access by only 
0.03 of an index point.
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6Trust in institutions and people
The efficient, effective and equitable operation of society not only requires the investment of money 
and natural resources, but also cooperation between individuals and institutions that constitute a 
society’s ‘social capital’ (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Fahey, Nolan and Whelan, 
2003). Trust reflects individual beliefs about whether the behaviour of other people can be relied 
on – for example, in obeying laws as well as showing consideration to strangers. It also reflects 
whether public policy institutions can be relied on to act fairly (Anderson et al, 2009, pp. 55ff). 
An individual’s past experience of people doing what they say they will do and public institutions 
delivering services effectively is a basis for assessing the trustworthiness of individuals, political parties 
or government. A high level of trust creates confidence in public services and it may also stimulate 
economic development (Mandl et al, 2007). On the other hand, the absence of trust reduces the radius 
of cooperation with family and friends and makes it more difficult for government to rely on the support 
of citizens (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Robert Putnam’s (1993) theory of social capital links trust in people and in political institutions. 
Putman postulates that positive informal relations in the home, at work and in local communities 
encourage people to create formal organisations that can then ‘spill up’, leading to the formation of civil 
society institutions that represent the views and interests of individuals and social partners to national 
government. In turn, they can cooperate in representing interests and attitudes to EU institutions. The 
European Commission is now engaging in dialogue with civil society institutions in order to extend 
the radius of trust and cooperation from the lowest to the highest levels of the multilevel system that 
constitutes governance in Europe today (Robert Schuman Centre, 2009). 
The absence of trust is also significant. People who do not trust the government will be less likely to 
endorse policy initiatives and the taxes needed to pay for them, relying instead on their own resources, 
especially a narrow circle of friends and family, and what they can buy in the market. Insofar as trust is 
learned by experience, people who are socialised in societies where institutions are untrustworthy will 
be less willing to rely for their welfare on the collective services of government or other providers. The 
EU’s expansion in 2004 added 10 new Member States in which the median adult was socialised into 
a distrusted Communist political system (see Shlapentokh, 1989; Rose, 2009, Chapter 2). Moreover, 
corruption in government has been a recurring problem in some of the EU15 countries as well as the 
12 NMS (see Transparency International).
Trust in political institutions is important to public officials and Members of Parliament (MPs) as a 
mark of popular respect or, where it is absent, a lack of respect. For this reason, an extensive body 
of social science literature exists about the causes and correlates of political trust (see, for example, 
Newton, 2007). However, there is much less evidence-based research about the political consequences 
of trust.
Measuring	trust
The focus of trust differs radically: trust in other people is about informal personal relationships, while 
trust in political institutions concerns large-scale impersonal bureaucratic institutions (Newton, 2007, 
pp. 343ff). The EQLS takes this into account by asking questions about both types of relationships. It 
asks about political parties, which Putnam (1993) treats as central in linking informal social capital 
to national government. The survey also asks about authoritative state institutions, such as the police 
and the legal system. Respondents rate each institution on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 indicating 
‘no trust at all’ to 10 denoting ‘complete trust’ (Figure 13).
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Figure	13:	Index	of	trust	in	political	institutions	and	people
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Source: EQLS 2007
Across the EU, Europeans tend to adopt a sceptical rather than a trusting or distrustful view of 
institutions (on scepticism, see Mishler and Rose, 1997). According to the EQLS results, the average 
level of trust for five political institutions (4.9), including the parliament, the legal system, the police, 
the government and political parties, is just below the middle of the 10-point scale (Figure 13). 
Among the political institutions, trust is higher in institutions wielding authority firmly – that is, the 
police (6.1) and the legal system (5.2). The average for both is above the arithmetic midpoint. By 
contrast, the averages for the three representative institutions – the government (4.6), parliament (4.6) 
and political parties (3.9) – are below the midpoint, and there is a difference of more than two points in 
the average level of trust in political parties (3.9) and the police (6.1). In keeping with the tendency of 
having doubts about institutions, few Europeans express extreme views. On average, only 3% endorse 
complete trust in a political institution, while 13% express no trust in an institution. 
In terms of the trustworthiness of most people, the average European takes a sceptical view. With an 
average of 5.2, trust in most people is significantly below that for trust in the police (6.1). The similarity 
of the average level of trust in people and of trust in institutions is consistent with Putnam’s (1993) 
hypothesis that the two objects of trust reflect a single outlook. However, this may be an artefact of 
conflating trust in most people with people one knows. Surveys that ask about each group separately 
consistently find a much higher level of trust in people one knows. For example, in 10 of the NMS, an 
average of 72% of citizens trust most people they know, while only 42% of them trust most people in 
their country (Rose, 2005, p. 66). 
Insofar as individuals have a pervasive disposition to either trust or distrust, then a factor analysis 
should find that trust in people and trust in institutions should be similar statistically. However, this is 
not the case (see Annex Table A2). All five political institutions have high loadings. By contrast, trust 
in most people does not, and its low loading shows that it is not strongly related to trust in institutions. 
This finding is consistent with many other empirical studies rejecting Putnam’s theory (see Newton, 
2001; Uslaner, 2002, p. 54). 
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The factor analysis thus justifies creating an index that includes trust in the five political institutions 
named in Figure 13. It also justifies treating trust in most people as a separate attitude. The average 
score for the Trust in Political Institutions Index is 4.9, whereas the average score for trust in most 
people is 5.2. There are widespread differences of opinion on both counts. Two fifths of people are 
more or less inclined to trust institutions, while a further two fifths are inclined to be distrustful. The 
willingness to trust other people similarly varies. One third are below the median point for trusting 
other people, while more than two fifths are above this point. These variations may be accounted for by 
differences in national context, in individual resources or by a combination of both sets of influences. 
How	countries	differ	in	levels	of	trust
Consistent with theories that trust in political institutions reflects the way in which national government 
works, large differences emerge among the EU countries in their average levels of trust. The level of 
trust is highest in Denmark (7.2 on a 10-point scale) and Finland (6.9); it is lowest in Bulgaria (3.3) 
and Latvia (3.5). Trust in people also differs substantially within every country (Table 2). 
Table	2:	Trust	in	political	institutions	and	in	people,	by	country
Trust	in	political	institutions Trust	in	most	people
DK 7.2 7.2
FI 6.9 7.0
SE 6.2 6.8
NL 6.1 6.5
AT 6.0 4.8
LU 5.9 5.8
MT 5.5 4.9
ES 5.5 5.7
EE 5.3 5.1
IE 5.3 5.8
BE 5.2 5.6
DE 5.2 4.8
FR 5.1 5.5
EL 4.9 4.2
UK 4.9 5.3
SK 4.7 5.2
PT 4.5 4.3
SI 4.3 5.2
IT 4.2 5.0
RO 4.2 5.5
CZ 4.0 4.5
HU 4.0 4.7
PL 4.0 4.8
LT 3.8 4.4
LV 3.5 4.0
BG 3.3 4.1
EU15 5.1 5.3
EU26* 4.9 5.2
NMS12 4.0 4.8
Notes: The score for political trust represents the average for the five political institutions listed in Question 27 (see Figure 13), 
based on a 10-point scale, where 1 = ‘do not trust at all’ and 10 = ‘trust completely’. * Cyprus is omitted from the results. 
Source: EQLS 2007
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In Communist systems, the one-party state purged institutions of civil society. Instead of social 
partners, government ministries controlled large industrial complexes and the ruling Communist party 
also controlled trade unions. This generated a high level of political distrust and has left a legacy of 
weak civil society institutions and widespread distrust in political institutions (Howard, 2003; Rose 
and Munro, 2009). In the 10 NMS that formerly had Communist regimes, the average level of trust in 
political institutions is 4.0, while in the EU15 countries it is more than a full point higher (5.1) (Table 
2). On the other hand, as the repressive nature of Communist regimes encouraged people to establish 
strong face-to-face ties with friends and family, the average score for trusting people in the NMS is 
higher at 4.8. However, the radius of trust in other people is smaller in the NMS countries.
Maintaining the integrity of political institutions is a challenge for governments across the whole of 
Europe. Where a government is successful in doing so, this encourages trust in political institutions, 
whereas where corruption is perceived to be widespread, trust is substantially lower. The correlation 
between trust in political institutions and a country’s rating on the Transparency International CPI is 
very strong (r: 0.85). The Nordic countries scoring highest on the Transparency International index 
of integrity in government also have the highest ratings regarding trust in institutions. On the other 
hand, people in countries that score lowest in government transparency, such as Bulgaria, Latvia and 
Lithuania, express the least trust in political institutions (Figure 14). The association between poor 
government transparency and low levels of trust in political institutions cuts across the EU15 and NMS: 
Estonia maintains a similar position to Portugal and Spain on both counts, while Greece and Italy can 
be found close to Poland and Hungary. 
National scores for ‘trust in most people’ also correlate significantly with the scores on the CPI (r: 0.49). 
However, the relationship is not so strong as that for political trust. This is because trust in most people 
is not distributed between countries in the same way as trust in political institutions. For example, 
although Romania and the UK register a similar level of trust in most people, there is a big difference 
in the extent to which their governments are perceived as corrupt or transparent.
Figure	14:		Relationship	between	transparency	in	government	and	trust	in	political	
institutions,	by	country
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Individual	resources	and	trust
Insofar as trust in political institutions is associated with political participation, the resources that 
people have to participate in public affairs ought to increase political trust (see Verba et al, 1995; 
Blais, 2000). Income and education are two major resources making individuals more effective political 
participants and they have a positive effect on trust in political institutions. In relation to the latter, the 
average score of individuals with an adequate income is 0.9 of a point higher than for those having 
trouble making ends meet (Table 3). Among people with more education, trust in political institutions 
is 0.7 of a point higher. Similarly, significant differences can be found for trust in most people. On the 
other hand, age only slightly increases trust in political institutions, while gender is of no importance. 
Moreover, on the basis of age and gender, the relationship is similar for trust in most people.
Given the tendency for individual resources to be correlated, an OLS regression analysis can test the 
conjoint effect of all four resources. Such an analysis confirms that income and education are the most 
important influences on political trust; it also gives additional weight to the effect of age but not gender. 
Together, the four influences account for 8.9% of the difference between individuals in political trust 
and for 5.5% of the difference in trust in most people (see Annex Table A3).
Combining	individual	and	national	contexts
The single biggest influence on trust in political institutions is national context: the better a government’s 
rating on the Transparency International CPI, the higher the level of political trust is likely to be. After 
controlling for all other influences, government transparency accounts for almost two points in the 10-
point Political Trust Index (Figure 15).
People’s economic resources also have a substantial impact. Whether a government is transparent or 
not, citizens whose income is very adequate show greater trust in government by more than a full point 
more than those with a very inadequate income. Individuals with insufficient incomes are also likely 
to be the most deprived, and this additionally lowers their trust. 
Church attendance also has a substantial effect on political trust (Figure 15). People who go to church 
regularly tend to be more trusting in political institutions by more than half a point. Older people also 
tend to be more trusting. Since this influence is confirmed after controlling for other factors, it means 
Table	3:		Relationship	between	individual	resources	and	trust	in	political	institutions	and	in	
most	people
Trust	in	political	institutions	(average	score) Trust	in	most	people	(average	score)
Adequate	income
Yes 5.2 5.5
No 4.3 4.7
Third-level	education
Yes 5.4 5.8
No 4.7 5.0
Age
Young 4.9 5.2
Old 5.1 5.3
Gender
Female 4.9 5.2
Male 4.9 5.3
Source: EQLS 2007
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that older churchgoers are inclined to show greater trust in political institutions by almost a point higher 
than young persons who do not attend church. The effect of education on trust is positive; however, the 
impact is less than half that of age and one third the impact of church attendance. 
Figure	15:	Multilevel	model	of	major	influences	on	political	trust
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The Political Trust Index shows the average response to the five political trust questions asked in the EQLS.
Source: Calculated from multilevel model shown in Annex Table A8
How one is integrated in society affects political distrust. However, having more or fewer political 
contacts is not significantly related to trust. More significant is being from a family that have been 
citizens for generations – while this group constitutes the majority in all countries, it is becoming less the 
case since the opening up of national borders to migration between continents as well as within Europe. 
People in this group are more distrustful of political institutions (Figure 15). The impact is increased 
if a person lives in a neighbourhood that is heterogeneous in race or religion. If these characteristics 
are combined with an inadequate income and a lack of further education, this creates a limited but 
statistically significant category of young, uneducated, poor citizens with strong roots in their country 
but with a high level of distrust in political institutions.
For the most part, trust in other people reflects influences that are similar to those for political 
institutions, although the scale of the impact is not as strong10 (see Annex Table A8). Since the extent 
of government transparency encourages trust in most people in society, this implies that popular 
perceptions of government’s integrity can ‘spill down’ to affect people’s views of their fellow citizens 
generally. An individual’s economic resources also have a major impact: a good income tends to boost 
trust in most people by more than a point, while suffering multiple material deprivations diminishes 
trust in other people by almost 0.8 of a point. The impact of individual economic circumstances on 
trust in most people is thus even greater than their impact on political trust. 
Involvement in homogeneous social groups – whether being part of a church congregation or living 
in an ethnically homogeneous neighbourhood – has a positive effect on trusting most people. Third-
level education, which tends to mix people from diverse backgrounds at a young age, also creates 
10 The multilevel model accounts for 21.6% of the variance in trust in political institutions and for 13.6% of the variance in trust in most people. 
The impact of significant variables for trust in most people is as follows: 1.39 for transparency; 1.03 for adequacy of income; -0.79 for 
deprivation; 0.32 for further education; 0.25 for church attendance; -0.21 for ethnic heterogeneity; and 0.45 for political contacts.
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greater trust in other people. Up to a point, the multilevel model supports Putnam’s (1993) theory of 
political participation, since those with more political contacts are also more trusting of other people. 
However, the radius of trust is limited, as these contacts do not add up to trust in impersonal political 
institutions. Moreover, given the speculation about differences between urban and rural areas in social 
capital and trust (Mandl et al, 2007), it is noteworthy that the multilevel analysis found that there was 
no significant relationship between urban and rural residents in their trust in political institutions and in 
most people. Moreover, whether a region is below or above the EU average for economic development 
has no significant effect on trust. 
The results of the multilevel analysis support the theoretical argument that political trust is a 
consequence of public policy, as well as supporting empirical evidence of the negative legacy of 
Communist regimes for trust (Dasgupta, 1988; Newton, 2007). However, the legacy is not permanent 
nor can it be attributed to culture, as there is a degree of trust in all EU countries. The chief reason 
why people show less trust is rooted in the current performance of political institutions, as registered 
in the Transparency International CPI. If a national government is positively rated on the CPI – as 
governments in some but not all of the NMS are – then there is greater trust in most people as well 
as in political institutions. With one exception, none of the other indexes of government performance 
shows a comparable impact. The significant correlation (0.46) between a country’s public services 
and political trust indexes reinforces the judgment that it is the performance of a country’s political 
institutions that has major responsibility for popular trust or distrust.
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7Tensions in society
Every European society is divided by age, gender and economic resources. Among the 27 EU Member 
States, major differences also exist in the state’s relationship with religion, and within each country 
citizens differ greatly in the degree or absence of religious commitment. Historically, EU Member States 
have differed in the extent to which they are ethnically homogeneous. The increased transnational 
mobility of EU citizens, combined with inter-continental population movements, has introduced new, 
albeit often small, ethnic groups to many EU countries. 
EU policies celebrate diversity as a way of enhancing quality of life. Recognition is given to 23 official 
languages in publications and statements. The goal of social cohesion not only recognises the existence 
of differences within every society, but also the desirability of strong ties between groups that differ in 
gender, age and economic status. Three Directorates General of the European Commission – Education, 
Audiovisual and Culture, Information Society and Media – and the Europe Aid Cooperation Office11 
support action programmes promoting greater familiarisation of Europeans, especially young people, 
with other countries and cultures. 
The logic of social cohesion is that the differences which inevitably exist within society should be a 
source of strength, leading to cooperation between people who differ. For example, economic differences 
between employers and employees are not ignored, but are the subject of collective bargaining. 
Given that social, economic and political differences are inevitable within every society, the substantive 
issue for the EU and national governments is whether differences are politicised. Many differences – 
for example, whether people are born on an odd or an even numbered day of the month – are of no 
political relevance. At any one time, there are a limited number of issues that can catch the attention of 
policymakers. The larger the proportion of Europeans who think that differences are a source of tension, 
the greater the responsibility of policymakers to act before tensions threaten social cohesion. Although 
tensions may be manifest in local neighbourhoods, there is also an EU dimension when they reflect 
differences found in every European society – for instance, between classes of society and income 
groups – and especially when tensions are the consequence of the transnational movement of people.
Measuring	social	tensions
Whether and to which extent social differences are translated into tensions in society is an empirical 
question. To assess this, the EQLS asked people to assess whether tensions exist in their society 
between six different social groups. Two of these social groups are economic – that is, management 
and workers, and rich and poor; two concern different religions, racial and ethnic groups; and two focus 
respectively on young and old persons, and on men and women. If people perceive tension, they are 
asked to rate it as ‘a lot of tension’ or ‘some tension’. On the other hand, they can endorse the opposite 
alternative – that is, ‘no tension’. 
Across Europe, the overall tendency is to recognise some tension in society. For each of the six social 
groups, almost half of the respondents choose this intermediate position, and for four of the groups 
an absolute majority do so (Figure 16). However, the proportion of respondents perceiving lots of 
tension varies greatly. As many as 40% of respondents perceive a lot of tensions in racial and ethnic 
relations, but less than half of this proportion (18%) do so for relations between young and old persons 
or between women and men (12%). It is particularly noticeable that economic differences are no more 
likely to cause a lot of tension than are racial and religious differences.
11 See http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm. 
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Figure	16:	Overview	of	tensions	perceived	between	different	social	groups	(%)
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Tensions in society can coexist with tensions within individuals themselves. Thus, some individuals 
are likely to project their psychological tensions onto society, rather than assess their society as it is. 
If this was the case, then people who perceive tension in one part of society would consistently see it 
in other parts. However, this is not in fact the case. Only 7% of EQLS respondents consistently report 
seeing tensions across all segments of society, while just 3% never observe any tensions. 
A factor analysis confirms that feelings of tension about one social group are not necessarily generalised 
to another group. Unlike questions about public services, access to health services and trust in political 
institutions, the factor analysis of tensions identifies two different factors (see Annex Table A9). The 
first factor, accounting for 47% of the variance, loads highest for tensions between rich and poor 
people and between managers and workers.12 It is thus justifiable to combine individual answers to 
questions about tensions between rich and poor people and between managers and workers to create 
an ‘economic tensions scale’. Religious, racial and ethnic differences load highly on the second factor, 
which accounts for over 16% of the variance. Distinctions between religious, racial and ethnic groups 
can sometimes overlap. Hence, attitudes towards tensions between religious and ethnic groups are 
analysed together. 
Economic	tensions
Although European economies were doing well when the EQLS was undertaken in 2007, this did not 
produce harmony between management and workers or between rich and poor people. The largest 
group of respondents (43%) took an intermediate position, perceiving some tensions on both counts. 
A lot of tension on at least one count was perceived by 41% of the respondents, including 20% who 
12 The relationship recurs in almost exactly the same degree in separate factor analyses for the EU15 Member States and the NMS, and in an 
analysis of comparable questions asked in the 2003 EQLS.
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viewed a lot of tension in both respects. Only 7% of respondents perceived no economic tensions in 
their society on either count, while 9% saw some tension on one count. 
Europeans who regard their income as inadequate are more likely to perceive economic tensions in 
their society. The tendency is 0.2 of a point on the 3-point scale, where a score of 2 represents a ‘lot of 
tension’, 1 ‘some tension’ and 0 ‘no feeling of tension’. Those who do not have any difficulty in making 
ends meet often see some tensions as well (see Annex Table A10). More educated people, who ought 
to be more aware of problems of society, are slightly less likely to see tensions in society than are less 
educated persons. Economic tensions are somewhat asymmetrical: they are felt more by people at the 
bottom of the social ladder than by those with a better income and education. Younger people are 
slightly more likely to perceive tensions in economic life; however, there is no difference on this count 
between men and women. As almost every European sees at least some economic tension, there is 
much less variation to explain. While an OLS regression finds all four variables statistically significant, 
the total amount of variance accounted for is very low at just 2.3%. 
Major differences are evident between countries in the perceived degree of economic tension – ranging 
from a score of 1.6 in Hungary to 0.7 in Denmark (see Annex Table A11). However, the extent of 
tension does not follow a simple division between the EU15 and NMS. For example, the score for 
France (1.4) is double that for Denmark (0.7), while the score for Hungary (1.6) is almost two thirds 
greater than that for Bulgaria (1.0). Overall, there is no difference between the overall average score 
for the NMS (1.2) and for the EU15 (1.2). While it may be theoretically argued that greater economic 
inequality should increase economic tension, the correlation between the Gini index of inequality and 
a country’s level of perceived economic tension is not statistically significant (0.22).
Looking at the multilevel model of major influences on economic tensions, the most striking feature 
is how little impact 14 major social and economic indicators have on economic tension. Even though 
eight different indicators – notably, regional development, income adequacy, deprivation, age, gender, 
church attendance, being a long-term citizen and political contacts – achieve a degree of statistical 
significance, collectively they account for only 4.8% of the variance in economic tension (Figure 17). 
The national context has no statistically significant impact on economic tension, once individual 
differences are taken into account. Moreover, the multilevel model confirms that living in a country 
with a higher Gini coefficient of income inequality has no effect on individual perceptions of tensions. 
Similarly, economic tension does not seem to reflect objective economic circumstances: a country’s 
GDP per capita has no significant influence on economic tensions. There is, however, a contextual 
Figure	17:	Multilevel	model	of	major	influences	on	economic	tensions
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difference within countries: living in a region where economic development is higher reduces economic 
tensions by 0.15 of a point on the 3-point scale. 
A person’s economic situation has the biggest impact on the perception of tensions, although the extent 
is not that large. Those whose income is adequate are likely to be 0.25 of a point below the norm for 
sensing economic tension in their society. Conversely, if a person belongs to that small group suffering 
a high level of deprivation, they will be almost 0.2 of a point higher on the scale measuring perceived 
tension (Figure 17). 
People who have political contacts are more likely to perceive economic tensions in their society, 
increasing the pressure on policymakers. Tensions are also more likely to be felt by long-term citizens 
who may be more integrated in party politics. The impact of age, gender and church attendance on 
economic tensions lacks direct integration with the political and policy process. 
Racial,	ethnic	and	religious	tensions
European countries are today becoming ethnically more heterogeneous. The free movement of people 
within the EU has resulted in 13% of EQLS respondents either being born in a different country from 
that in which they are now living or having one or both parents who are not native-born. Entry to the 
EU is also open to people born in other continents who have family, ethnic or ex-colonial ties to a 
Member State. In addition, the growth in cheap air transport has made it possible for people to travel 
across continents in search of work or political refuge. Legally, the status of all citizens of Europe is the 
same, whatever their race, creed or nationality of origin. 
Differences in the religious, ethnic and racial composition of national populations vary greatly between 
the EU Member States and tend to have increased in recent decades – although no country is as 
diverse on all three counts as the US. The development of the Single European Market has facilitated 
geographical mobility across Europe. Migrants who differ in race, ethnicity and/or religion from host 
societies have been attracted to EU countries. This is reflected in the perception of tensions: 40% of 
respondents see racial and ethnic differences as causing a lot of tension, while 31% associate religion 
with a lot of tension. In addition, almost half of the respondents (49%) see some tension (see Figure 16).
In many cases, a person can be distinctive on multiple counts – for example, being a Nigerian and a 
Muslim or an Algerian and a Muslim. The high correlation (0.62) of European perceptions of tensions 
on religious, racial and ethnic grounds justifies creating a single Religious and Racial Tensions Index 
(see Annex Table A13). According to the EQLS results, 25% of respondents perceive a lot of tension 
on both counts, while 36% see some tensions in both respects, and 30% see no tension on one count 
but some or a lot on the other. Only 9% of respondents report no racial, religious or ethnic tension in 
their society.
Economic conditions are often cited as an explanation for tensions, based on the assumption that a 
largely migrant group of people competes for scarce jobs or lowers wages. Insofar as this is the case, 
it is likely that lower paid workers and those with less education would be most threatened. However, 
low income people are, at most, only 4% more likely to see racial tensions, while less educated 
persons are only 3% more likely to see tensions (Table 4). Young people are more likely to see tensions 
than older people, and there is also a slight tendency for tensions to be felt more by women than 
men. Socioeconomic differences cannot explain the sense of racial, ethnic or religious tension. OLS 
regressions confirm that income, education and gender make no substantial difference to feelings of 
tension: together, they only account for 1% of the variance in racial and religious tensions. 
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An alternative explanation is that racial, ethnic and religious tensions are caused by people who the 
majority perceive are ‘not like us’. Whereas longstanding minorities in a society may be integrated or 
at least be familiar – for example, people of Irish nationality living in Britain or ethnic Turks living in 
Bulgaria – groups of migrants that differ in race, language and religious practices will not appear like 
the settled majority community. Nonetheless, according to the EQLS results, people whose families 
are long-established citizens are only 2% to 4% more likely to perceive religious or racial tensions 
than people whose families have an immigrant character (Table 4). Where people live also affects 
tensions: those who live in very mixed neighbourhoods are 4% to 7% more likely to consider that there 
is a lot of tension in their society. Among people who go to church, there is actually a significantly 
lower perception of religious or ethnic tension than among those who do not go to church. Given that 
many immigrants are often practising Muslims, this implies that Christian churchgoers tend to be less 
disturbed by people with an alternative religious commitment than are those who are not churchgoers 
or who have a secular view of their society. 
Table	4:	Relationship	between	individual	resources	and	racial	and	religious	tensions
%	perceiving	a	lot	of	racial	tension %	perceiving	a	lot	of	religious	tension
Adequate	income
Yes 38 30
No 42 32
Third-level	education
Yes 37 29
No 40 31
Age
Young 40 31
Old 34 26
Gender
Female 41 32
Male 39 29
Long-term	citizen
Yes 40 31
No 36 29
Churchgoer	(at	least	monthly)
Yes 34 25
No 42 33
Racial,	ethnic	neighbourhood	mix
Many people different from majority 45 34
Some people different from majority 39 31
Almost no one different 38 30
Source: EQLS 2007
Collectively, the EU is multicultural: Member States differ in establishing a state religion or having 
none, in language use and in national identities. A few countries, such as Belgium, were created 
as a multi-ethnic state, where the Flemings and the Walloons each speak a different language and 
historically have also been internally divided by religion and class. In countries such as Hungary and 
Romania, there is a notable Roma minority. Bulgaria and Finland, meanwhile, have an ethnic minority 
that is a legacy from past imperial settlements: in the case of Finland, this minority comprises Swedes, 
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while in Bulgaria it comprises Turks. The EQLS pan-European focus meant that it did not include 
questions about tensions with minorities found in a limited number of countries, such as the Roma 
minority group. Some countries are ethnically and racially homogeneous; this tends to be the case in 
central and east European states, such as Poland, that suffered from the forced movement of population 
and genocide during the Second World War. 
Large differences are evident between countries in the extent of perceived tensions between ethnic 
and racial groups. In the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands, at least half 
of the population sees racial and ethnic differences as a source of ‘a lot of tension’ (see Annex Table 
A13). Conversely, in five of the NMS – namely, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – a 
fifth or less of respondents perceive a lot of tension in this respect (Figure 18). Low levels of perceived 
tension in the Baltic states is particularly noteworthy – indicating that they have largely succeeded in 
accommodating substantial minorities of Russian ethnics, some of whom are not citizens (Pettai and 
Zielonka, 2003; Rose et al, 2006). Tension between religious groups is perceived to be high in Austria, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands, where more than two fifths of respondents see a lot of tension. 
However, in 11 countries, less than one fifth of people view religion as a source of a lot of tension – 
in three of these countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia – less than one tenth of respondents 
report this tension. 
Consistent with the factor analysis of individuals, at the national level there is a strong and significant 
correlation (0.82) between the aggregate level of religious tension and racial and ethnic tension (Figure 
18). It is particularly noteworthy that the EU15 countries tend to be substantially higher on both 
measures of tension than their NMS counterparts. This pattern leaves open to empirical testing the 
cause of these differences. 
A country’s attractiveness to immigrants varies according to economic circumstances, as well as 
geographical and historical ties. Statistics about immigrants are notoriously difficult to collect. EU 
Figure	18:	Relationship	between	racial	and	religious	tensions,	by	country	(%)
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Member States differ in national practices for registering such information or not doing so, and the 
EU’s encouragement of the free movement of people across national borders makes it difficult to keep 
statistics up to date. Eurostat (2008) statistics collected from national statistical offices identify four 
countries – namely, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK – with more than 400,000 immigrants from 
other continents as well as from other EU countries. Three smaller countries have more than 100,000 
immigrants – namely, Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands. Countries that attract a large proportion of 
immigrants do so because they are prosperous: a large and significant correlation is evident between 
a country’s GDP per capita and the percentage of its population that is made up of immigrants (r: 
0.55). An even stronger correlation can be observed between GDP and immigrants from outside the 
EU (r: 0.70). In addition, marginally significant correlations are visible at the national level between 
immigration from outside the EU and racial and ethnic tensions (r: 0.37) as well as religious tensions 
(r: 0.41).
Statistics about religion are difficult to collect, and this is doubly true when the focus is on the religion 
of non-EU immigrants. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) (2006) 
estimates – on the basis of official national statistics and unofficially documented data – that there are 
approximately 13 million Muslims living in the EU (for a discussion on a country-by-country basis, 
see the European Parliament Policy Department, 2007, pp. 81ff). Even after discounting for the special 
situation of Bulgaria, where the historic Muslim population represents 12% of the national population, 
the EU’s Muslim population is unevenly distributed. In 13 countries, less than 1% of the population is 
estimated to be Muslim, while in five countries – namely, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Germany 
and Austria – it ranges between 5.8% and 4.1% (Figure 19).
Figure	19:		Correlation	between	percentage	of	Muslims	in	population	and	racial/religious	
tension,	by	country	(%)
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Moreover, while the percentage of Muslims is less in the UK and Spain, each of these two populous 
countries is estimated to have more than one million Muslim inhabitants (EUMC, 2006, pp. 29–33).
Although Muslims represent only a few percent of the population of any European society, the 
percentage of Muslims in a society has a strong and significant correlation with the perception of 
religious tension in a society (Figure 19). This correlation appears to be caused by the extent to which 
the majority population perceives Muslims as aliens who are ‘not like us’. The link is greater in more 
prosperous countries, where Muslim immigrants tend to be concentrated. For example, in Sweden, 
where 4.4% of the population is estimated to be Muslim, 31% of respondents perceive a lot of racial 
or religious tension. In the EU15 countries, where Muslims constitute an estimated 3.3% of the total 
population, some 33% of people report that there is a lot of religious tension. On the other hand, in the 
NMS, where only 0.07% of the population is estimated to be Muslim, there is no significant association 
with religious tension. 
The first step in testing whether attitudes towards religious and racial or ethnic tensions reflect the 
same causes was to undertake separate multilevel model regressions for each measure and – using the 
same independent variables – including the estimated percentage of Muslims in the population and 
the percentage of non-EU immigrants. Since the same conditions influenced both measures, the two 
indicators of tension have been combined into a single measure of religious, racial and ethnic tension.13 
Doing so recognises that the perceived objects of tension often differ from their host community on 
grounds of both religion and ethnicity or race. 
National context has the biggest impact by far on the index of religious, racial and ethnic tensions 
(see Figure 20 and Annex Table A14). Where Muslims are most numerous, reported tensions tend to 
be more than one third of a point higher on the three-point index. Since a country’s overall proportion 
of non-EU immigrants is not statistically significant, this supports the view that it is the characteristics 
of Muslim migrants in Europe that are associated with tension rather than simply being an immigrant 
from any non-EU country. In addition, countries with the highest level of GDP per capita tend to have 
a level of perceived tension that is almost one third of a point higher. The influence on tension is smaller 
with regard to living in a neighbourhood that is ethnically heterogeneous and being part of a family of 
long-established citizens. 
Individual economic characteristics have some offsetting impact: individuals with a more adequate 
income are less likely to sense religious or ethnic tensions. However, a person who is well off in a 
country with high GDP is more likely to feel religious and racial tension than an individual who is 
well off in a country with low GDP. Moreover, those who have difficulty in making ends meet in a 
prosperous country are even more likely to feel such tensions. The fact that being employed has no 
significant impact on tension indicates that it is cultural differences rather than job competition that 
accounts for tension. This point is reinforced by the finding that being more deprived economically does 
not significantly alter an individual’s feeling of tension. 
Even though the oldest members of society will have experienced the biggest changes in its composition, 
they are substantially less likely to perceive tensions between racial or religious groups. This may be 
because they are less involved in society, which would be consistent with the finding that people who 
13 The composite index was created by scoring 2 points for respondents who saw a lot of tension on both counts (25%); 1.5 for those who saw a 
lot of tension on one count and some on the other (17%); 1 point for respondents perceiving some tension on both counts (39%); 0.5 of a point 
for those seeing some tension on one count and none on the other (9%); and 0 points for respondents perceiving no tension on both counts 
(10%). The average index score is 1.20 and the standard deviation is 0.61.
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have more political contacts are associated with seeing more religious and racial tension. Churchgoers 
are also less likely to feel tension arising from people with different beliefs entering their society – this 
is an indication that tensions do not reflect doctrinal differences but rather cultural and behavioural 
differences. 
Figure	20:	Multilevel	model	of	major	influences	on	perceived	religious	and	racial	tensions
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Tensions	related	to	age	and	gender
Although differences according to age and gender are found in every society, they are not primary 
grounds for competition between political parties. With greater or lesser success, parties try to appeal 
for the votes of men and women and of young and old persons. There are no ‘women only’ or ‘men 
only’ parties in Europe, and when parties are created to represent pensioners, they demonstrate that 
few older people will vote for them (Hanley, 2008). Consistent with this, only a limited minority of 
Europeans report that they see a lot of tension between young and old persons (17%) or between men 
and women (12%). Similarly, on the 3-point scale for measuring tension, the average score for tension 
related to gender falls between none and some (0.8). A similar score is reported for tension between 
age groups (0.9). 
Even though tension is low, significant social consequences could arise if the level of tension was 
perceived differently by women and men, or by young people and old persons. However, this is not 
the case. The percentage of women seeing a lot of gender tension in society amounts to 13% compared 
with 10% for men. When controls are introduced for income, age and education, gender remains a 
statistically significant influence on the perception of tension, but its association is very weak (see 
Annex Table A10). A multilevel model analysis confirms this result (see Annex Table A15). The impact 
of being female increases the perception of gender tension by 0.09 of a point, but this is barely half 
the impact that having major difficulty in making ends meet has on the perception of economic tension 
in a country. Living in the EU15 or NMS has no significant effect on tension: 12% of people report 
a lot of tension in the EU15 and 11% do so in the NMS. Overall, neither contextual nor individual 
characteristics make much difference to the low level of perceived tension between men and women. 
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Turning to the issue of age, the greater longevity of older people has meant that pensions constitute 
the biggest claim on public expenditure. Concurrently, declining birth rates result in fewer people of 
working age financing the rising cost of pensions. Since young workers must contribute for up to 40 
years before they can draw a pension, frequent claims of an increasing conflict of economic interest 
between young and old people have arisen (for a review, see Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009).
However, not only is the perception of tension between young and old people low, such a perception 
also appears to be evenly spread across age groups. Of those aged 18–29 years, 18% see a lot of 
tension; almost the same proportion of people aged 65 years or over hold the same view. A multivariate 
OLS regression analysis finds no significant influence on the perception of intergenerational tensions 
(see Annex Table A16). Thus, no social group appears to be particularly prone to perceiving tension 
between young and old people. Contextual differences are similarly insignificant: in the EU15 Member 
States, some 17% of respondents see a lot of tension between age groups; in the NMS, where the 
collapse of the old regime introduced a fundamental discontinuity in experience between generations, 
this proportion is only slightly higher at 20%. The multilevel model regression can account for only 
0.9% of the variance and age again fails to achieve statistical significance. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has taken a strong stand against age discrimination, and this is 
consistent with the EQLS finding that on many important issues of public policy there is no age divide. 
For example, even though pensions are of particular importance for older people, they give first priority 
for public expenditure to health services, as do younger people (Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009). Similarly, 
the low level of tension between men and women can be interpreted as reflecting the positive influence 
of EU policies, including major efforts to promote gender equality. 
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8Policy implications for social cohesion
Social cohesion is about achieving a minimum of differences between Member States and between 
social groups. However, the Eurofound quality of society indexes identify significant differences 
between people and between countries. Insofar as these differences are cumulative across all indexes, 
this would constitute social and cross-national polarisation. Nevertheless, if those who are badly off 
economically vary from one index to another, their problems cannot be addressed through a ‘one size 
fits all’ solution. The appropriate response would be to target policies carefully to address specific 
limitations on social cohesion.
Constructing	a	standardised	index
A technical problem arises when comparing indexes. In some questions, respondents are asked to 
make an evaluation on a 10-point scale, while in others they are asked to rate their answer on a 
3-point or 4-point scale. In order to make comparisons across indexes, it is necessary to create a 
standard metric. This can be done by setting the average score for EQLS countries at 100 and giving 
each country a score according to its distance from this average. Thus, if the average index score is 
2.5, a country with a score of 2.0 would have a standardised score of 80 – that is, four fifths of the 
European average. Similarly, a country with an average score of 2.75 would have a standardised score 
of 110. Standardised scores make it possible to determine whether or not countries tend to be above 
the European average on some indexes and below the average on others. 
When each country’s standardised score is averaged across all indexes, there is a great deal of bunching: 
for instance, the average score for 23 of the EU27 Member States is between 90 and 110 (Table 5). The 
countries’ standardised average score is spread far less than that in relation to the countries’ GDP per 
capita, their Gini index of inequality, or their rating on the Transparency International CPI. Only two 
countries score higher than 10% above the average for quality of society – namely, Denmark (120) and 
Finland (114) – while two countries are well below the average – that is, Hungary (81) and Italy (83). 
Generalisations about high and low quality societies assume that most countries will either be 
consistently above or below the European average. In fact, no country is consistently above average 
on all six indexes determining the quality of society (Table 5). The best performing countries – Denmark 
and Finland – fall short due to their high level of perceived tension between racial, ethnic and religious 
groups. Only Hungary and Italy consistently have a below-average score. Overall, the EU15 Member 
States are only one point above the average on the 100-point standardised index, while the average 
score for NMS countries is only two points below the standardised index.
The critical question for social cohesion is not whether countries differ but how great the differences are. 
For instance, are they so large as to appear as differences in kind or are they of a size consistent with 
the EU’s commitment to combining unity and diversity? On four indexes, substantial cross-national 
differences are evident (Figure 21). It should be noted that for consistency in comparison across indexes, 
tension scores have been reversed, making their high standardised score reflect a low level of tension. 
The biggest is between countries with a high or low level of economic tension. In Denmark, for example, 
the index score for the proportion of respondents indicating that there is not a lot of economic tension 
(153) is more than half that of the European average (100). At the other extreme, Hungary’s score (42) 
reflects the relatively high proportion of citizens who perceive a lot of economic tension. While there is 
a tendency for tensions to be higher in the NMS than in the EU15, this trend does not apply uniformly. 
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In France and Germany, for instance, economic tension is significantly greater than in most of the NMS 
countries. Cross-country differences in racial, religious and ethnic tension are also substantial: a gap 
of 88 points exists between Latvia, where such tension is lowest, and the Netherlands, where it is the 
highest. Moreover, a 79-point difference can be found between countries in relation to political trust, 
with Denmark and Bulgaria marking the two extremes. The standard deviations for these two tension 
measures show that a third of countries will differ by more than 44 points in economic tensions and 
by 48 points regarding racial and religious tension (Table 5). The standard deviation for political trust 
indicates that one third of the countries will be outside the range of 80 to 120.
Table	5:	Standardised	index	for	aspects	of	quality	of	society,	by	country
Index	of
Public	services Neigh-
bourhood
Access	
to	health	
services
Political	trust Low	economic	
tension
Low	religious/	
racial	tension
Average
DK 115 111 109 144 153 85 120
FI 124 112 109 137 112 100 114
CY 90 103 100 102 133 112 110
SE 115 110 109 125 117 79 108
EE 102 101 103 107 95 131 107
MT 116 93 100 110 128 100 106
IE 97 103 103 106 115 98 105
LV 84 97 97 70 105 149 104
AT 115 106 102 120 115 70 103
LU 119 98 107 118 92 101 103
NL 112 109 109 121 110 61 102
ES 103 101 99 110 101 98 102
SK 97 100 95 95 95 122 101
PT 82 98 90 90 105 123 101
UK 102 106 106 98 112 78 100
BG 74 84 97 65 113 141 100
BE 115 98 105 105 105 81 99
DE 98 108 101 105 82 88 97
RO 88 99 96 85 91 111 96
LT 95 94 97 76 76 134 95
PL 93 91 94 79 89 120 95
EL 79 91 97 98 86 104 95
SI 101 106 96 86 75 97 92
FR 104 99 107 102 72 69 90
CZ 103 103 95 80 84 90 90
IT 88 87 83 85 96 62 83
HU 89 93 93 80 42 96 81
EU15 105 103 102 111 105 86 101
NMS12 94 97 97 86 94 117 98
EU27	(average) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Standard		
deviation
13 7 6 20 22 24 9
Notes: 100 = Average national score for a given index. The results are weighted equally. The computation of a standardised 
index score involves calculating a coefficient by dividing 100 by the index average for the EU27 countries weighted equally 
and then multiplying each country’s average by the coefficient.
Source: EQLS 2007
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While there is a great variation between countries in their GDP per capita, popular satisfaction with the 
quality of public services varies much less. At the extreme, satisfaction is highest in Finland (124) and 
lowest in Bulgaria (74) (Figure 21). However, there is only an 11-point difference between the average 
evaluation in the EU15 Member States and the NMS. Moreover, four of the NMS have above-average 
levels of satisfaction with the quality of public services. At the same time, in three of the EU15 Member 
States – Italy, Greece and Portugal – satisfaction with public services is closer to that in Bulgaria 
than to the European average (Table 5). There is even less cross-national difference (28 points) in the 
evaluation of neighbourhoods. Cross-national differences for access to health services are even lower.
The EQLS shows that it is more realistic to think of ‘countries with problems’ rather than ‘problem 
countries’, because individual countries are not consistently above or below average on the indexes 
of quality of society and of public services. While some EU Member States have more problems than 
others, none can claim to be consistently high in its quality of society. Thus, instead of characterising 
countries in global terms, policymakers can use the EQLS findings in Table 5 and Figure 22 (see next 
section) to concentrate efforts on those issues where performance is below the EU average.
Policy	pointers
Three groups of people are below the EU average for three or more aspects of quality of society: those 
who are materially worse off; people who live in culturally heterogeneous neighbourhoods; and those 
whose government tends to be corrupt. However, the groups most affected are not the same for every 
indicator, nor is the degree to which they are disadvantaged. To make comparisons, the measures of 
impact reported separately in previous chapters have been standardised according to a 10-point scale14 
(Figure 22). The following subsections describe the recommended policy pointers for the three groups of 
people – as just outlined – who are below the EU average for three or more aspects of quality of society.
14 Impacts are standardised to a 10-point scale by dividing 10 by the number of units in each scale and multiplying the quotient by the impact 
initially reported in the multilevel model tables in Chapters 3–7. Thus, if a scale has only 3 points, as is the case for tensions, the impact scores 
are multiplied by 3.33.
Figure	21:	Differences	between	countries	on	quality	indexes
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Material	deprivation
Any European who finds it fairly or very difficult to live on their income and is deprived of at least 
three out of six commonly enjoyed items – such as replacing worn out furniture or a week’s holiday 
– is defined as badly off materially (see Anderson et al, 2009, pp. 8ff). This group is limited in size: 
8% of people are found to be badly off in income and deprived; a further 14% are considered to be 
lacking on one or the other count. Those who are badly off consistently evaluate quality of society less 
favourably than those who are better off. Although all European citizens are supposed to have equality 
in treatment by public officials, for those experiencing material difficulties access to health services is 
1.8 points lower on the standardised scale, while the quality of public services is rated lower by 1.4 
points (Figure 22a). Poor services among this group are paralleled by a higher level of political distrust. 
Moreover, economic tensions are unevenly distributed: the scores in this respect are 1.6 points higher 
among those who are worst off compared with those who are best off materially. 
Figure	22:	Overview	of	major	social	influences	on	quality	of	society
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Major policy implications that follow from this EQLS evidence include:
• boosting the income of the poorest people and relaxing means-tested charges for access to health 
services;
• training public officials to show, through their words and actions, more positive engagement with 
problems that low-income members of society have in dealing with public bureaucracies; 
• scrutinising tax and tax expenditure policies for consistency with European norms and encouraging 
social partners to emphasise common interests of management and workers in response to economic 
recession.
Culturally	mixed	neighbourhoods
The EQLS analysis also finds that people living in culturally mixed neighbourhoods tend to evaluate 
quality of society less favourably than those living in areas where the country’s traditional population 
dominates. Across Europe today, 87% of people are long-term citizens, since both their parents as 
well as they themselves were born in their country of residence. A majority of this group lives in a 
neighbourhood populated by people like themselves. However, almost one tenth of people live in 
neighbourhoods that are very mixed according to race and religion, while almost one third reside 
in neighbourhoods that are to some extent mixed. The same is true for two thirds of those whose 
attachment to the country does not extend across the generations. 
In culturally mixed neighbourhoods, people’s evaluation of their local services tends to be 1.5 points 
lower than the EU average (Figure 22b). This is not because the neighbourhoods are difficult for 
public agencies to reach – in fact, they are usually urban areas where public services are most readily 
delivered. While recent immigrants may tend to settle in more run-down neighbourhoods with cheaper 
housing, this does not justify public neglect. In short, immigrants call attention to neighbourhood 
deficiencies that have been cumulating over the years. 
The EU is multi-ethnic and multi-confessional within a Christian context. It promotes programmes 
encouraging respect for the rights of minority groups that have long been resident in Europe. An 
unintended consequence of economic expansion and the free movement of persons has been an increase 
in immigration from countries outside the EU. The EQLS finds that racial and religious tensions are 
highest in prosperous countries that have attracted a relatively large percentage of Muslim immigrants. 
Tensions are driven not so much by physical proximity but by a more diffuse popular concern about 
the development of a multicultural society. The principle of subsidiarity recognises that there are some 
issues that require action at the European level – such as tensions arising from the transnational and 
intercontinental movement of people into the European public space, and the maintenance of the rights 
and freedom of all people in the EU. 
In light of this, there are certain measures that must be addressed by national and local governments, 
as follows:
• where neighbourhoods have substandard services, service providers should give priority to 
preventing further deterioration and to raising standards to the norm for the city as a whole;
• governments should address racial, ethnic and religious tensions through policies that encourage 
migrants to develop a good understanding of national norms where they live – they should also 
encourage longstanding citizens to appreciate positive features of economic and cultural integration 
(European Parliament Policy Department, 2007).
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Government	corruption
Giving a higher financial priority to public policies designed to help disadvantaged people through 
education, job training and other means is important. However, how governments administer services 
also has a major impact on how citizens evaluate their quality of society and public services. The 
greater the transparency and lower the corruption in public administration, the more positive the 
evaluation of quality of society appears to be (Figure 22c). The standard measure of the integrity of 
public administration – the CPI of Transparency International – primarily reflects the behaviour of 
administrations allocating procurement contracts worth millions and of fundraisers for political parties 
and politicians. The extent of corruption shows the degree to which governments are unwilling or 
unable to enforce laws against their own elected and non-elected officials, as well as the extent to which 
they are likely to administer policies ineffectively. 
Although relatively few people pay bribes for public services, corruption at the highest levels of 
government makes the public perceive all of government as corrupt (see Transparency International 
website; Mishler and Rose, 1997). Perceived corruption is the single biggest cause of distrust in political 
institutions. Moreover, whether citizens see their government as honest or corrupt has just as much 
impact as material conditions on how they rate public services and neighbourhood services (Figure 22). 
Governors have a direct interest in promoting greater trust. This is particularly the case for EU 
institutions such as the European Central Bank, which requires trust in its monetary policies to produce 
the responses required to promote economic stability and growth. Corruption can also distort activities 
in the Single European Market through the counterfeiting of trademarks and certificates of origin. 
The EU gives priority to preventing corruption in the disbursement of EU funds by national governments. 
Addressing this issue was a condition of admitting Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 2007. However, 
the problem is not confined to just two countries. While most EU countries rank in the higher levels 
of the 10-point Transparency International CPI, a third of the countries fall below the midpoint of the 
index, representing one third of the EU’s population. 
Given the importance of transparency in this context, to improve quality of public services it is 
recommended that governments should strengthen anti-corruption policies and their enforcement in 
order to make their procedures more transparent. 
Relevance	of	EQLS
The EQLS can provide a more nuanced picture of European citizens and society, consistent with the 
call of the European Commission (2009) to improve policymaking tools for ‘measuring progress in a 
changing world’. The Commission emphasises the need for multiple measures of the quality of life, 
rather than relying on a single aggregate measure of material wealth – that is, GDP, which cannot 
show how benefits are distributed within a society or how members evaluate conditions that their 
government claims to improve. The Commission particularly stresses the development of ‘robust direct 
measurements’ of output – such as the quality of public services and the quality of life – to complement 
measures of inputs to social well-being such as public expenditure. This report has shown how quality 
of society and of public services can be evaluated in fields for which the EU and national governments 
take responsibility (Anderson et al, 2009).
On the whole, a score of ‘6’ on a 10-point index scale is positive in terms of how the average European 
rates the quality of public services – nonetheless, it also indicates that more could be done to improve 
society and public services. The scepticism of many Europeans about political institutions is a sign 
57
Policy	implications	for	social	cohesion
that people are neither pro nor anti-government but open to altering their evaluations in line with its 
performance. The EU’s Open Method of Coordination offers a forum for governors to become better 
informed about policies to improve their performance. However, turning sceptics into more positive 
citizens requires actions as well as words. 
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Annex:  
Indicators used and data tables
Table	A1:	EQLS	indicators	used	in	analysis
Minimum Maximum Average Standard	
deviation
Indexes        
Question 56 Public services satisfaction 1 least 10 most 5.92 1.60
Question 47 Access to health services 1 very difficult 3 no difficulty 2.54 0.50
Question 54 Neighbourhood environment 1 many complaints 4 no complaints 3.38 0.62
Question 27 Political trust 1 least 10 most 4.90 1.97
Tensions	between:         
Question 25(1)(2) Rich and poor, managers and workers 0 none 2 a lot 1.18 0.56
Question 25(5)(6) Different racial, religious groups 0 none 2 a lot 1.20 0.61
Question 25(3) Men and women 0 none 2 a lot 0.82 0.62
Question 25(4) Old and young 0 none 2 a lot 0.94 0.64
Economic	factors        
Question 19 Number of deprivations 0 6 0.98 1.54
Question 57 Income adequacy 1 very difficult 6 very easy 3.86 1.26
HH2d Employed or self-employed 0 no 1 yes 0.52 0.50
Social	and	political	factors        
HH2b Age 18 years 88+ years 47.21 17.77
Question 49 Further education: codes 4–6 0 no 1 yes 0.28 0.45
HH2a Female 0 no 1 yes 0.52 0.50
Question 20 Number of political contacts 0 3 0.35 0.70
Question 70 Long-term citizen 0 no 1 yes 0.87 0.33
Question 53 Mixed religion, race 0 homogeneous 2 mixed 0.56 0.69
Question 17 Number of housing problems 0 none 4+ 0.59 0.94
Question 22 Church attendance 0 never 5 times at least/week 2.07 1.92
Question 52 Urban 0 no 1 yes 0.47 0.50
Regional	economy	as	%	EU	average	GDP	 1 <50% 6 >125% 4.08 1.66
Transparency	International	CPI 3.7 most corrupt 9.4 least corrupt 6.51 1.78
GDP	per	capita,	thousands	of	€,	PPS	(Eurostat,	2007) 9.3 38.0* 23.43 7.88
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) 22.5 least unequal 38 most unequal 29.02 4.41
Public	expenditure	on	health,	thousands	of	€,	PPS/
inhabitant
0.31 3.78 1.48 0.87
%	Muslims	in	population	(excludes	Bulgaria) 0.01 5.79 1.81 1.87
Non-EU	immigrants	in	2006,	%	population 0.00 1.14 0.34 0.27
Notes: Question numbers refer to those in the EQLS questionnaire (see Anderson et al, 2009, Annex 1). For details of indexes, 
see Chapters 3 to 7. Numerical results are for the EU27 Member States and weighted by population.
PPS = purchasing power standards.
* In multilevel models, to avoid a skewed distribution, the artificially high GDP per capita of Luxembourg (€66,300) was 
rounded up to just above the next highest national GDP.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A2:	Factor	analyses	for	indexes	
Principal	components
1 2 3 4
%	variance	accounted	for: 29.6 14.0 9.4 8.8
Eigenvalue: 6.22 2.93 1.98 1.84
Trust
Question 27(5) Trust in government 0.88 0.18 0.05 0.07
Question (1) Trust in parliament 0.87 0.17 0.04 0.08
Question 27(6) Trust in political parties 0.83 0.19 0.03 0.07
Question 27(2) Trust in legal system 0.80 0.20 0.09 0.10
Question 27(4) Trust in police 0.65 0.24 0.15 0.04
Public	services
Question 56(4) Public services: childcare 0.09 0.80 0.12 0.06
Question 56(5) Public services: care for elderly 0.11 0.79 0.12 0.06
Question 56(2) Public services: education 0.22 0.72 0.12 0.09
Question 56(3) Public services: public transport 0.14 0.70 0.07 0.10
Question 56(1) Public services: health 0.25 0.68 0.12 0.22
Question 56(6) Public services: state pensions 0.27 0.68 0.05 0.06
Neighbourhood	services
Question 54(2) Neighbourhood: air pollution 0.06 0.06 0.80 0.08
Question 54(6) Neighbourhood: litter or rubbish 0.08 0.10 0.76 0.04
Question 54(1) Neighbourhood: noise 0.04 0.03 0.75 0.06
Question 54(5) Neighbourhood: crime 0.09 0.06 0.74 0.10
Question 54(3) Neighbourhood: green areas 0.01 0.13 0.74 0.13
Question 54(4) Neighbourhood: water quality 0.07 0.17 0.63 0.12
Access	to	health	services
Question 47(2) Access to health services: appointment 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.83
Question 47(3) Access to health services: waiting time 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.81
Question 47(1) Access to health services: distance 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.71
Question 47(4) Access to health services: cost 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.68
Notes: Factors with eigenvalues of less than 1.0 are omitted. Varimax rotation. 
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A3:	Individual	resources	and	quality	of	society	indexes
	
	
Income	
adequacy
Age Education Female Urban R2	%
	 (Beta	values,	OLS	regressions)
Public	services .26*** .03*** .02** .00 .01* 6.9
Neighbourhood .22*** .09*** .04*** -.01 -.24*** 11.5
Crime -.15*** -.05*** -.03*** .00 .23*** 7.8
Health	services	 .21*** .00 .10*** -0.03*** .00 6.6
Trust	in	political	institutions .25*** .06*** .10*** .01* -.01 8.9
Trust	in	most	people .18*** .03*** .12*** .00 .00 5.5
Notes: *** significant at .001 level. 
** significant at .01 level. 
* significant at .05 level. 
Source: EQLS 2007
Table	A4:	Evaluation	of	each	public	service,	by	country
Health	
services
Education	
system
Public	
transport
Childcare Care	for	
elderly
State	
pensions
Index	
average
Standard	
deviation
FI	 7.6 8.4 7.3 7.9 6.7 7.0 7.5 1.0
LU 7.4 6.4 7.6 7.1 6.9 7.2 7.2 1.5
MT 7.0 7.8 6.1 7.8 7.6 6.1 7.0 1.6
AT 7.8 7.5 7.2 7.0 6.3 5.8 7.0 1.5
BE	 7.7 7.4 6.9 6.9 6.6 6.1 7.0 1.2
DK 7.0 7.6 6.8 7.4 6.5 6.4 7.0 1.4
SE 7.6 7.4 6.8 7.6 6.1 5.6 6.9 1.3
NL	 7.2 6.9 6.5 6.8 6.4 6.7 6.8 1.0
FR	 7.1 6.5 6.7 6.3 5.6 5.2 6.3 1.2
CZ 6.4 7.2 6.4 7.1 5.7 4.3 6.2 1.4
ES 6.8 6.5 6.5 6.1 5.6 5.1 6.2 1.4
EE 6.0 6.8 6.7 6.5 5.6 5.3 6.2 1.4
UK 6.5 6.6 6.3 6.3 5.8 4.9 6.1 1.6
SI 5.8 6.8 5.8 7.1 6.2 4.9 6.1 1.5
EU15 6.4 6.3 6.4 6.2 5.7 5.0 6.0 1.5
DE	 6.0 5.8 6.6 6.3 6.1 4.5 5.9 1.6
IE	 4.9 7.3 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.9 1.7
SK 5.8 6.7 6.0 6.6 5.4 4.6 5.9 1.5
LT 5.2 6.1 6.7 6.6 5.0 4.4 5.7 1.7
PL 5.0 6.4 6.3 6.4 5.1 4.4 5.6 1.6
CY 5.9 6.6 3.8 6.2 5.5 4.8 5.5 1.6
NMS12 5.3 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.0 4.2 5.5 1.7
HU 5.1 5.9 5.8 5.7 5.4 4.2 5.4 1.7
IT	 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.1 5.0 5.3 1.5
RO 5.5 5.9 6.3 5.3 4.4 4.2 5.3 1.9
LV 5.0 5.9 6.1 5.6 4.4 3.4 5.0 1.6
PT	 4.9 5.4 5.7 5.6 4.8 3.3 5.0 1.5
EL	 4.9 5.1 6.0 5.0 4.2 3.3 4.8 1.7
BG 4.7 4.9 5.3 4.6 3.4 2.7 4.5 1.6
EU27 6.1 6.6 6.3 6.4 5.6 5.0 5.9 1.6
Note: Index gives each individual’s average response to the six public service questions in the EQLS. Replies are based on a 
10-point scale, where 1 = ‘very poor quality’ and 10 = ‘very high quality’.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A5:	Multilevel	model	of	Public	Services	Index
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
Transparency	International	CPI .23 .05 4.54 .000 1.31
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) -.05 .02 -1.82 .081 ns
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP	 .01 .02 .54 .586 ns
Urban .00 .05 -.08 .936 ns
Further	education -.12 .04 -3.25 .002 -.12
Female	 -.01 .02 -.64 .523 ns
Age .00 .00 .67 .506 ns
Income	adequacy .22 .02 13.36 .000 1.12
Number	of	deprivations	 -.05 .01 -3.71 .000 -.29
Long-term	citizen -.21 .06 -3.69 .000 -.21
Mixed	religion,	race -.04 .02 -1.78 .075 ns
Number	of	political	contacts -.10 .02 -4.60 .000 -.29
Church	attendance .05 .01 5.09 .000 .26
Variance	accounted	for	(Pseudo	R2): 19.4%
Notes: Results are for EU27 Member States and are weighted equally; sample comprises 31,390 respondents. Impact is 
calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range of each independent variable; ns = not significant. 
Source: EQLS 2007
Table	A6:	Multilevel	model	of	Neighbourhood	Services	Index
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
Transparency	International	CPI .08 .02 3.57 .002 .48
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) .00 .01 -.70 .494 ns
Urban -.29 .04 -7.78 .000 -.29
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP	 -.01 .02 -.88 .382 ns
Age .00 .00 5.65 .000 .14
Female	 -.02 .01 -2.51 .012 -.02
Further	education -.02 .02 -1.55 .122 ns
Income	adequacy .04 .01 6.26 .000 .20
Number	of	deprivations	 -.01 .01 -1.89 .059 ns
Mixed	religion,	race -.14 .01 -10.79 .000 -.28
Long-term	citizen -.04 .02 -1.96 .050 -.04
Number	of	political	contacts -.06 .01 -5.56 .000 -.17
Number	of	housing	problems -.05 .01 -5.81 .000 -.22
Church	attendance .001 .003 -.37 .712 ns
Variance	accounted	for	(Pseudo	R2): 20.4%
Notes: Results are for EU27 Member States and are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,607 respondents. Neighbourhood 
Services Index shows the average response to six neighbourhood questions. Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied 
by the range; ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Figure	A1:	Scores	for	Access	to	Health	Services	Index,	by	country
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Notes: Index gives each individual’s average response to the four questions on access to health services after exclusion of 
‘don’t know’ answers and of those who say they have not accessed a health service. Responses are given on a 3-point scale, 
where 1 = ‘very difficult’ and 3 = ‘no difficulty’.
Source: EQLS 2007 
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Table	A7:	Multilevel	model	of	Access	to	Health	Services	Index
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) -0.01 0.01 -1.66 0.111 ns
Public	spending	on	health,	thousands	of	€,	PPS/inhabitant 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.832 ns
Urban	 0.01 0.01 1.26 0.210 ns
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP	 0.01 0.01 1.48 0.140 ns
Female	gender -0.03 0.01 -5.35 0.000 -0.03
Age 0.00 0.00 -1.29 0.197 ns
Further	education 0.01 0.01 1.18 0.239 ns
Number	of	deprivations	 -0.04 0.00 -10.67 0.000 -0.25
Income	adequacy 0.05 0.01 10.28 0.000 0.27
Employed	or	self-employed 0.01 0.01 1.39 0.166 ns
Mixed	religion,	race -0.02 0.01 -2.29 0.022 -0.03
Long-term	citizen 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.657 ns
Number	of	political	contacts -0.02 0.01 -3.01 0.003 -0.05
Church	attendance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.999 ns
Variance	accounted	(Pseudo	R2): 10.9%
Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 25,761 respondents. 
Malta is excluded because of missing data for public spending on health. 
Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range. 
PPS = purchasing power standards.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A8:	Relationship	between	trust	and	multilevel	models
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
Trust	in	political	institutions	
Transparency International CPI .34 .06 5.85 .000 1.92
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004) -.03 .02 -1.15 .263 ns
Urban -.04 .04 -.99 .321 ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP .03 .02 1.13 .259 ns
Further education .18 .05 3.48 .001 .18
Age .00 .00 2.95 .004 .35
Female gender .02 .03 .62 .537 ns
Income adequacy .23 .02 1.31 .000 1.13
Number of deprivations -.07 .02 -3.94 .000 -.45
Long-term citizen -.25 .07 -3.43 .001 -.25
Mixed religion, race -.06 .02 -2.57 .010 -.11
Church attendance .11 .02 6.66 .000 .56
Number of political contacts .05 .03 1.58 .115 ns
Variance accounted (Pseudo R2): 21.6%
Trust	in	most	people
Transparency International CPI .24 .10 2.54 .018 1.39
Gini coefficient (Eurostat, 2004) -.04 .02 -1.66 .111 ns
Urban -.01 .05 -.17 .869 ns
Regional economy, % EU average GDP .00 .03 .01 .989 ns
Further education .32 .06 5.53 .000 .32
Age .00 .00 .80 .426 ns
Female gender -.02 .03 -.54 .590 ns
Income adequacy .21 .02 8.93 .000 1.03
Number of deprivations -.13 .01 -9.40 .000 -.79
Long-term citizen .07 .07 .97 .332 ns
Mixed religion, race -.10 .04 -2.91 .004 -.21
Church attendance .05 .01 3.32 .001 .25
Number of political contacts .15 .03 5.88 .000 .45
Variance accounted (Pseudo R2): 13.6%
Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 31,299 respondents. Political Trust Index shows the average response 
to five political trust questions. 
Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A9:	Factor	analysis	of	tensions
2007 2003 2007*
Factor	1 Factor	2
Variance	explained,	%: 47.4 16.7 53.1 55.1
Eigenvalues 2.84 1.00 2.12 2.20
Loadings
Poor	and	rich .77 .12 .74 .76
Managers	and	workers .77 .13 .72 .75
Men	and	women .69 .24 .73 .74
Old	and	young .66 .27 .72 .72
Religious	groups .19 .88 – –
Racial/ethnic	groups .22 .87 – –
Notes: * Reduced to four services to match the number of variables in the 2003 EQLS questionnaire. 
Factors with eigenvalues of less than 1.0 are omitted. Varimax rotation. 
Source: EQLS 2003 and 2007
Table	A10:	Relationship	between	individual	resources	and	economic	tensions	
	 Economic	tensions	(average	score)
Adequate	income	
 Yes 1.1
 No 1.3
Third-level	education
 Yes 1.1
 No 1.2
Age
 Young 1.2
 Old 1.1
Gender	
 Female 1.2
 Male 1.2
Note: A score of 2 represents ‘a lot of tension’, 1 ‘some tension’ and 0 ‘no feeling of tension’. 
Source: EQLS 2007 
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Table	A11:	Scores	for	Economic	Tensions	Index,	by	country
  A	lot	of	tension,		
rich	and	poor	(%)
A	lot	of	tension,	
management	and	
workers	(%)
A	lot	of	tension,	
both	counts	(%)
Average	index Standard	deviation
HU 71 63 56 1.6 .50
FR 43 44 27 1.4 .50
SI 35 46 28 1.3 .51
LT 47 34 28 1.3 .53
DE	 36 42 26 1.3 .57
CZ 40 34 23 1.3 .55
EL	 36 46 26 1.2 .62
NMS12 38 34 25 1.2 .58
PL 34 31 20 1.2 .54
RO 37 34 27 1.2 .63
LU	 32 37 21 1.2 .58
SK 31 27 19 1.2 .54
EU15 28 32 19 1.2 .55
EE 31 20 13 1.2 .48
IT 28 31 18 1.2 .54
ES	 24 34 20 1.1 .61
PT	 23 26 17 1.1 .57
BE 24 22 10 1.1 .51
LV 32 16 14 1.1 .54
NL	 12 19 6 1.0 .41
UK 17 20 9 1.0 .50
FI	 13 14 5 1.0 .41
BG 27 17 13 1.0 .58
IE	 18 18 9 1.0 .54
AT	 20 16 9 1.0 .53
SE	 11 7 3 1.0 .38
MT 13 18 8 .9 .58
CY 11 12 7 .8 .52
DK	 4 4 1 .7 .45
EU27 30 32 20 1.1 .56
Note: Economic Tensions Index gives each individual’s average response to the questions about tension between rich and 
poor, and between management and workers.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A12:	Multilevel	model	of	Economic	Tensions	Index
B	
coefficient	
Standard	
error
T-ratio P Impact
GDP	per	capita,	thousands	of	€,	PPS	(Eurostat,	2007) .00 .01 .66 .516 ns
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) .00 .01 .23 .823 ns
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP -.03 .01 -4.98 .000 -.15
Urban .00 .01 -.04 .971 ns
Income	adequacy -.05 .01 -8.26 .000 -.25
Number	of	deprivations	 .03 .01 6.02 .000 .19
Employed	or	self-employed .01 .01 1.07 .286 ns
Age .00 .00 -3.66 .000 -.10
Female	gender .04 .01 3.62 .001 .04
Further	education .00 .01 -.38 .701 ns
Long-term	citizen .04 .02 2.37 .018 .04
Mixed	religion,	race .02 .01 1.55 .120 ns
Number	of	political	contacts .03 .01 5.95 .000 .10
Church	attendance -.01 .00 -3.48 .001 -.06
Variance	accounted	(Pseudo	R2): 4.8%
Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,946 respondents. 
Impact is calculated as the b coefficient multiplied by the range of each independent variable. 
PPS = purchasing power standards.
ns = not significant. 
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A13:	Racial	and	religious	tensions,	by	country
  Race,	ethnicity Religion Tensions	index*
NL	 58 40 1.4
IT	 54 46 1.4
FR	 53 40 1.4
AT	 42 41 1.4
UK	 42 33 1.3
SE	 37 31 1.3
EU15 42 34 1.3
BE	 44 31 1.3
DK 36 32 1.2
DE	 33 32 1.2
CZ 53 25 1.2
HU 50 22 1.1
SI 30 22 1.1
ES	 34 23 1.1
IE	 34 20 1.1
FI	 33 16 1.1
MT 43 18 1.1
LU	 37 23 1.1
EL	 36 22 1.0
RO 30 19 1.0
CY 23 14 1.0
NMS12 28 17 0.9
PL 19 17 0.9
SK 22 10 0.9
PT	 22 13 0.9
EE 20 7 0.8
LT 16 13 0.8
BG 12 8 0.7
LV 15 7 0.6
EU27 39 31 1.2
Note: Results show the proportion of people feeling ‘a lot of tension’. * Combined score on feeling tension on both measures: 2 
= ‘a lot of tension’; 0 = ‘no tension’.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A14:	Multilevel	model	of	racial	and	religious	tensions
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
GDP	per	capita,	thousands	of	€,	PPS	(Eurostat,	2007) 0.01 0.00 2.76 0.012 0.30
%	of	Muslims	in	population	 0.06 0.01 5.62 0.000 0.35
Non-EU	immigrants	in	2006,	%	population 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.995 ns
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP	 -0.01 0.01 -0.76 0.449 ns
Urban 0.00 0.02 -0.09 0.930 ns
Age -0.003 0.00 -6.28 0.000 -0.26
Female	gender 0.07 0.01 5.53 0.000 0.07
Further	education -0.03 0.01 -1.73 0.083 ns
Income	adequacy -0.03 0.01 -6.03 0.000 -0.15
Number	of	deprivations	 -0.01 0.00 -1.72 0.086 ns
Employed	or	self-employed 0.01 0.01 0.46 0.642 ns
Long-term	citizen 0.07 0.02 3.74 0.000 0.07
Mixed	religion,	race 0.02 0.01 2.00 0.046 0.04
Number	of	political	contacts 0.02 0.01 3.17 0.002 0.07
Church	attendance -0.01 0.00 -3.79 0.000 -0.07
Variance	accounted	(Pseudo	R2): 8.6%
Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 29,098 respondents. 
Bulgaria is excluded because of its large indigenous Muslim population.
PPS = purchasing power standards.
ns = not significant.
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A15:	Multilevel	model	of	gender	tension	
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
Transparency	International	CPI 0.04 0.02 1.86 0.074 ns
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.800 ns
Urban 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.969 ns
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP	 -0.01 0.01 -0.93 0.351 ns
Female	gender 0.09 0.01 7.57 0.000 0.09
Age 0.00 0.00 -1.97 0.049 -0.06
Further	education -0.02 0.01 -1.65 0.099 ns
Income	adequacy -0.03 0.01 -5.04 0.000 -0.16
Number	of	deprivations	 0.02 0.00 3.89 0.000 0.09
Employed	or	self-employed 0.02 0.01 1.72 0.085 ns
Mixed	religion,	race 0.01 0.01 1.76 0.077 ns
Long-term	citizen 0.04 0.03 1.35 0.177 ns
Number	of	political	contacts 0.02 0.01 2.45 0.014 0.05
Church	attendance 0.00 0.00 -0.22 0.823 ns
Variance	accounted	(Pseudo	R2): 0.9%
Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,485 respondents.
ns = not significant. 
Source: EQLS 2007
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Table	A16:	Multilevel	model	of	tensions	between	young	and	old	people
B	coefficient Standard	error T-ratio P Impact
Transparency	International	CPI 0.02 0.02 0.83 0.415 ns
Gini	coefficient	(Eurostat,	2004) 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.885 ns
Urban 0.04 0.02 2.12 0.034 0.04
Regional	economy,	%	EU	average	GDP	 -0.02 0.01 -2.09 0.036 -0.09
Female	gender 0.07 0.01 5.54 0.000 0.07
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.26 0.796 ns
Further	education -0.03 0.01 -2.00 0.045 -0.03
Income	adequacy -0.03 0.01 -5.61 0.000 -0.16
Number	of	deprivations	 0.02 0.01 3.41 0.001 0.11
Employed	or	self-employed 0.00 0.01 0.43 0.671 ns
Mixed	religion,	race 0.02 0.01 2.10 0.035 0.05
Long-term	citizen 0.04 0.02 1.76 0.078 ns
Number	of	political	contacts 0.02 0.01 2.85 0.005 0.07
Church	attendance 0.00 0.00 -0.34 0.737 ns
Variance	accounted	(Pseudo	R2): 0.9%
Notes: Results are weighted equally; sample comprises 30,761 respondents.
ns = not significant. 
Source: EQLS 2007
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